# Decisions with multiple attributes

A brief introduction

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#### Aims

mainly pedagogical

- present elements of the classical theory
- position some extensions wrt this classical theory

Comparing holiday packages												
		cost	# of days	$_{ m time}^{ m travel}$	category of hotel	distance to beach	Wifi	cultural interest				
	A	200€	15	12 h	***	$45\mathrm{km}$	Y	++				
	B	425€	18	$15\mathrm{h}$	****	$0\mathrm{km}$	N					
	C	150€	4	$7\mathrm{h}$	**	$250\mathrm{km}$	N	+				
	D	300€	5	$10\mathrm{h}$	***	$5\mathrm{km}$	Y	_				

#### Central problems

- helping a DM choose between these packages
- helping a DM structure his preferences

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### Two different contexts

- decision aiding
  - careful analysis of objectives
  - careful analysis of attributes
  - careful selection of alternatives
  - availability of the DM
- 2 recommendation systems
  - no analysis of objectives
  - attributes as available
  - alternatives as available
  - limited access to the user

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#### Basic model

• additive value function model

$$x \gtrsim y \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i(x_i) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i(y_i)$$

x, y: alternatives

 $x_i$ : evaluation of alternative x on attribute i

 $v_i(x_i)$ : number

• underlies most existing MCDM techniques

#### Underlying theory: conjoint measurement

- Economics (Debreu, 1960)
- Psychology (Luce & Tukey, 1964)
- tools to help structure preferences

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## Outline: Extensions

- 6 Models with interactions
- 6 Ordinal models

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### Part I

Classical theory: conjoint measurement

## Outline

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# Aside: measurement of physical quantities

### Lonely individual on a desert island

- no tools, no books, no knowledge of Physics
- wants to rebuild a system of physical measures

### A collection a rigid straight rods

- $\bullet$  problem: measuring the length of these rods
  - pre-theoretical intuition
    - length
    - softness, beauty

### 3 main steps

- comparing objects
- creating and comparing new objects
- creating standard sequences

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
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
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- experimental to conclude which rod has "more length"
- rods side by side on the same horizontal plane




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#### Results

- $a \succ b$ : extremity of rod a is higher than extremity of rod b
- $a \sim b$ : extremity of rod a is as high as extremity of rod b

- $a \succ b$ ,  $a \sim b$  or  $b \succ a$
- ≻ is asymmetric
- $\sim$  is symmetric
- ≻ is transitive
- $\bullet \sim$  is transitive
- $\succ$  and  $\sim$  combine "nicely"
  - $a \succ b$  and  $b \sim c \Rightarrow a \succ c$
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### Summary of experiments

- binary relation  $\succeq = \succ \cup \sim$  that is a weak order
  - complete  $(a \succsim b \text{ or } b \succsim a)$
  - transitive  $(a \succsim b \text{ and } b \succsim c \Rightarrow a \succsim c)$

#### Consequences

- associate a real number  $\Phi(a)$  to each object a
- the comparison of numbers faithfully reflects the results of experiments

$$a \succ b \Leftrightarrow \Phi(a) > \Phi(b)$$
  $a \sim b \Leftrightarrow \Phi(a) = \Phi(b)$ 

- the function  $\Phi$  defines an ordinal scale
  - applying an increasing transformation to  $\Phi$  leads to a scale that has the same properties
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### Comments

#### Nature of the scale

- $\bullet$   $\Phi$  is quite far from a full-blown measure of length...
- useful though since it allows the experiments to be done only once

#### Hypotheses are stringent

- highly precise comparisons
- several practical problems
  - any two objects can be compared
  - connections between experiments
  - comparisons may vary in time
- idealization of the measurement process

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
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
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## Concatenation

- we want to be able to deduce  $\Phi(a \circ b)$  from  $\Phi(a)$  and  $\Phi(b)$
- $\bullet$  simplest requirement

$$\Phi(a \circ b) = \Phi(a) + \Phi(b)$$

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- five rods:  $r_1, r_2, ..., r_5$
- we may only concatenate two rods (space reasons)
- we may only experiment with different rods
- data:

$$r_1 \circ r_5 \succ r_3 \circ r_4 \succ r_1 \circ r_2 \succ r_5 \succ r_4 \succ r_3 \succ r_2 \succ r_1$$

• all constraints are satisfied: weak ordering and monotonicity

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	$\Phi$	$\Phi'$	$\Phi''$
$\overline{r_1}$	14	10	14
$r_2$	15	91	16
$r_3$	20	92	17
$r_4$	21	93	18
$r_5$	28	100	29

- $\Phi$ ,  $\Phi'$  and  $\Phi''$  are equally good to compare simple rods
- only  $\Phi$  and  $\Phi''$  capture the comparison of concatenated rods
- going from  $\Phi$  to  $\Phi''$  does not involve a "change of units"
- it is tempting to use  $\Phi$  or  $\Phi''$  to infer comparisons that have not been performed...
- disappointing

$$\Phi: r_2 \circ r_3 \sim r_1 \circ r_4 \quad \Phi'': r_2 \circ r_3 \succ r_1 \circ r_4$$



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# Step 3: creating and using standard sequences


- choose a standard rod
- be able to build perfect copies of the standard
- concatenate the standard rod with its perfects copies



$$S(8) \succ a \succ S(7)$$
  
 $\Phi(s) = 1 \Rightarrow 7 < \Phi(a) < 8$ 

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
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# Convergence

### First method

- choose a smaller standard rod
- repeat the process

### Second method

- prepare a perfect copy of the object
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### Extensive measurement

• Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky (1971, chap. 3)

### 4 Ingredients

- ① well-behaved relations  $\succ$  and  $\sim$
- ② concatenation operation ∘
- ③ consistency requirements linking  $\succ$ ,  $\sim$  and  $\circ$
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## Question

## Can this be applied outside Physics?

• no concatenation operation (intelligence!)

# What is conjoint measurement?

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- mimicking the operations of extensive measurement
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  - when several dimensions are involved

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# Example: Hammond, Keeney & Raiffa

### Choice of an office to rent

- five locations have been identified
- five attributes are being considered
  - Commute time (minutes)
  - Clients: percentage of clients living close to the office
  - Services: ad hoc scale
    - $\bullet$  A (all facilities), B (telephone and fax), C (no facility)
  - Size: square feet ( $\simeq 0.1 \text{ m}^2$ )
  - Cost: \$ per month

### Attributes

- Commute, Size and Cost are natural attributes
- Clients is a proxy attribute
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Clients	50	80	70	85	75
Services	A	B	C	A	C
Size	800	700	500	950	700
Cost	1850	1700	1500	1900	1750

- a single cooperative DM
- choice of a single office
- ceteris paribus reasoning seems possible
   Commute: decreasing
   Clients: increasing
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- dominance has meaning

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Clients	80	70	85
Services	B	C	A
Size	700	500	950
Cost	1700	1500	1900

- no more dominance
- assessing tradeoffs
- $\bullet$  all alternatives except c have a common evaluation on Commute
- $\bullet$  modify c in order to bring it to this level
  - starting with c, what is the gain on Clients that would exactly compensate a loss of 5 min on Commute?
  - difficult but central question

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	c	c'
Commute	20	25
Clients	70	$70 + \delta$
Services	C	C
Size	500	500
Cost	1500	1500

find  $\delta$  such that  $c' \sim c$ 

#### ${ m Answer}$

- for  $\delta = 8$ , I am indifferent between c and c'
- replace c with c'

	c	c'
Commute	20	25
Clients	70	$70 + \delta$
Services	C	C
Size	500	500
Cost	1500	1500

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  - neutralize Service using Cost as reference

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- what maximal increase in monthly cost would you be prepared to pay to go from C to B on service for c'?
  - answer: 250 \$
- what minimal decrease in monthly cost would you ask if we go from A to B on service for d?
  - answer: 100 \$

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	b	c'	c''	d	d'
Clients	80	78	78	85	85
Services	B	C	${f B}$	A	${f B}$
Size	700	500	500	950	950
Cost	1700	1500	1500 + 250	1900	1900 - 100

- replacing c' with c''
- replacing d with d'
- dropping Service

	b	c''	d'
Clients	80	78	85
Size	700	500	950
Cost	1700	1750	1800

- checking for dominance: c'' is dominated by b
- c'' can be dropped

- replacing c' with c''
- replacing d with d'
- dropping Service

	b	c''	d'
Clients	80	78	85
Size	700	500	950
Cost	1700	1750	1800

- checking for dominance: c'' is dominated by b
- c'' can be dropped

	b	d'
Clients	80	85
Size	700	950
Cost	1700	1800

- no dominance
- question: starting with b what is the additional cost that you would be prepared to pay to increase size by 250?
  - answer: 250 \$

	b	d'
Clients	80	85
Size	700	950
Cost	1700	1800

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• answer: 250 \$

	b	b'	d'
Clients	80	80	85
Size	700	<b>950</b>	950
Cost	1700	1700 + 250	1800

- replace b with b'
- drop Size

	b'	d'
Clients	80	85
Size	950	950
Cost	1950	1800
	b'	d'
Clients	80	85
Cost	1950	1800

- check for dominance
- d' dominates b'

#### Conclusion

• Recommend d as the final choice

- replace b with b'
- drop Size

	b'	d'
Clients	80	85
Size	950	950
Cost	1950	1800
	b'	d'
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- replace b with b'
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	b'	d'
Clients	80	85
Size	950	950
Cost	1950	1800
	b'	d'
Clients	b' 80	$\frac{d'}{85}$

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#### Remarks

- very simple process
- ullet process entirely governed by  $\succ$  and  $\sim$
- no question on "intensity of preference"
- notice that importance plays absolutely no rôle
- why be interested in something more complex?

- set of alternative is small
  - many questions otherwise
- output is not a preference model
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### Similarity with extensive measurement

- $\bullet$   $\succ$ : preference,  $\sim$ : indifference
- we have implicitly supposed that they combine nicely

- we should be able to prove that  $d \succ a, d \succ b, d \succ c$  and  $d \succ e$
- dominance:  $b \succ e$  and  $d \succ a$
- tradeoffs + dominance:  $b \succ c'', c \sim c', c' \sim c, d' \sim d, b' \sim b, d' \succ b'$

$$d \succ a, b \succ e$$

$$c'' \sim c', c' \sim c, b \succ c''$$

$$\Rightarrow b \succ c$$

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### $\operatorname{OK}...$ but where are the standard sequences?

- hidden... but really there!
- standard sequence for length: objects that have exactly the same length
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  - $c \sim c'$
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	c	c'	f	f'
Commute	20	25	20	25
Clients	70	<b>78</b>	78	82
Services	C	C	C	C
Size	500	500	500	500
Cost	1500	1500	1500	1500



# Monsieur Jourdain doing conjoint measurement

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[70, 78] has the same length [78, 82] on *Client* 

## Outline

- 1 An aside: measurement in Physics
- 2 An example: even swaps
- 3 Notation
- 4 Additive value functions: outline of theory

# Setting

- $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  set of attributes
- $X_i$ : set of possible levels on the *i*th attribute
- $X = \prod_{i=1}^{n} X_i$ : set of all conceivable alternatives
  - ullet X include the alternatives under study... and many others
- $J \subseteq N$ : subset of attributes
- $X_J = \prod_{j \in J} X_j, X_{-J} = \prod_{j \notin J} X_j$
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- $\bullet \ (x_i, y_{-i}) \in X$
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# Preference relations on Cartesian products

### Applications

- Economics: consumers comparing bundles of goods
- Decision under uncertainty: consequences in several states
- Inter-temporal decision making: consequences at several moments in time
- Inequality measurement: distribution of wealth across individuals
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- from objectives to attributes
- adequate family of attributes
- risk, uncertainty, imprecision

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- fundamental objectives: why?
- means objectives: how?

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skip examples

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
## Ignored


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▶ skip examples

### Keeney's view

- fundamental objectives: why?
- means objectives: how?





a means-ends objectives network

Table I. Preclosure Objectives and Performance Measures

Objective		Perfe	Performance measure			
Health-and-safety impacts						
. Minimize worker her radiation exposure repository		<i>X</i> <sub>1</sub> :	repository-worker radiological fatalities			
<ol> <li>Minimize public hear radiation exposure repository</li> </ol>		<b>X</b> <sub>2</sub> :	public radiological fatalities from repository			
<ol> <li>Minimize worker (a) nonradiological corepository</li> </ol>		<i>X</i> <sub>3</sub> :	repository-worker nonradiological fatalities			
<ol> <li>Minimize public fat nonradiological corepository</li> </ol>		X <sub>4</sub> :	public nonradiological fatalities from repository			
<ol> <li>Minimize worker he radiation exposur transportation</li> </ol>		X <sub>5</sub> :	transportation-worker radiological fatalities			
<ol> <li>Minimize public her radiation exposur transportation</li> </ol>		X <sub>6</sub> :	public radiological fatalities from transportation			
<ol> <li>Minimize worker fa nonradiological c transportation</li> </ol>		<i>X</i> <sub>7</sub> :	transportation-worker nonradiologica fatalities			
<ol> <li>Minimize public far nonradiological c transportation</li> </ol>		<i>X</i> <sub>8</sub> :	public nonradiological (atalities from transportation			
	Environmental	impacts				
9. Minimize aesthetic	degradation	Xa:	constructed scale"			
historical, and cu			constructed scale"			
<ol> <li>Minimize biologica</li> </ol>	l degradation	x,,	constructed scale"			
	Socioeconomic	impacts				
2. Minimize adverse s	ocioeconomic impacts	X12	: constructed scale"			
	Economic is	mpacts				
3. Minimize repositor	y costs	X	: millions of dollars			
4. Minimize waste-tra			millions of dollars			

Table 4.1. A constructed attribute for public attitudes

Attribute level	Description of attribute level		
1	Support: No groups are opposed to the facility and at least one group has organized support for the facility.		
0	Neutrality: All groups are indifferent or uninterested.		
- 1	Controversy: One or more groups have organized opposition, although no groups have action-oriented opposition. Other groups may either be neutral or support the facility.		
-2	Action-oriented opposition: Exactly one group has action- oriented opposition. The other groups have organized support, indifference or organized opposition.		
-3	Strong action-oriented opposition: Two or more groups have action-oriented opposition.		

#### Scale to Measure Biological Impact

- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of entirely agricultural or urban "habitat" with no loss of any "native" communities.
- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of primarily (75%) agricultural habitat with loss of 25% of second growth; no measurable loss of wetlands or endangered species habitat.
- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of farmed (50%) and disturbed (i.e., logged or new second-growth) (50%) habitat; no measurable loss of wetlands or endangered species habitat.
- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of recently disturbed (logged, plowed) habitat with disturbance to surrounding (within 1.0 mi of site border) previously disturbed habitat; 15% loss of wetlands and/or endangered species habitat.
- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of farmed or disturbed area (50%) and mature second-growth or other undisturbed community (50%); 15% loss of wetlands and/or endangered species.
- Loss of 1.0 mi² of primarily (75%) undisturbed mature desert community (i.e., sagebrush);
   15% loss of wetlands and/or endangered species habitat.
- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of mature second-growth (but not virgin) forest community; 50% loss of big game and upland game birds; 50% loss of local wetlands and local endangered species habitat.
- Loss of 1.0 mi<sup>2</sup> of mature second-growth forest community; 90% loss of local productive wetlands and local endangered species habitat.
- Complete loss of 1.0 mi² of mature virgin forest; 100% loss of local wetlands and local endangered species habitat.

Impact level	Impacts on historical properties in the effected area"		
0	There are no impacts on any significant historical properties		
1	One historical property of major significance or 5 historical properties of minor significance are subjected to minimal adverse impacts		
2	Two historical properties of major significance or 10 historical properties of minor significance are subjected to minimal adverse impacts		
3	Two historical properties of major significance or 10 historical properties of minor significance are subjected to major adverse impacts		
4	Three historical properties of major significance or 15 historical properties of minor significance are subjected to major adverse impacts		
5	Four historical properties of major significance or 20 historical properties of minor significance are subjected to major adverse impacts		

# Marginal preference and independence

## Marginal preferences

- $J \subseteq N$ : subset of attributes
- $\succsim_J$  marginal preference relation induced by  $\succsim$  on  $X_J$

$$x_J \succsim_J y_J \Leftrightarrow (x_J, z_{-J}) \succsim (y_J, z_{-J}), \text{ for all } z_{-J} \in X_{-J}$$

#### Independence

 $\bullet$  J is independent for  $\succsim$  if

$$[(x_J, z_{-J}) \succsim (y_J, z_{-J}), \text{ for some } z_{-J} \in X_{-J}] \Rightarrow x_J \succsim_J y$$

ullet common levels on attributes other than J do not affect preference

### Separability

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ullet varying common levels on attributes other than J do reverse strict preference

# Marginal preference and independence

## Marginal preferences

- $J \subseteq N$ : subset of attributes
- $\succsim_J$  marginal preference relation induced by  $\succsim$  on  $X_J$

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# Independence

#### Definition

- for all  $i \in N$ ,  $\{i\}$  is independent,  $\succeq$  is weakly independent
- for all  $J \subseteq N$ , J is independent,  $\succeq$  is independent

### Proposition

Let  $\succeq$  be a weakly independent weak order on  $X = \prod_{i=1}^n X_i$ . Then:

- $\succsim_i$  is a weak order on  $X_i$
- $[x_i \succsim_i y_i, \text{ for all } i \in N] \Rightarrow x \succsim y$
- $[x_i \succsim_i y_i, \text{ for all } i \in N \text{ and } x_j \succ_j y_j \text{ for some } j \in N] \Rightarrow x \succ y$ or all  $x, y \in X$

#### Dominance

- as soon as I have a weakly independent weak order
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## Independence

- ullet it is easy to imagine examples in which independence is violated
  - Main course and Wine example
- it is nearly hopeless to try to work if weak independence (at least weak separability) is not satisfied
- some (e.g., R. L. Keeney) think that the same is true for independence
- ullet in all cases if independence is violated, things get complicated
  - decision aiding vs AI

### May be excessive

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## May be excessive

## Outline

- An aside: measurement in Physics
- 2 An example: even swaps
- 3 Notation
- 4 Additive value functions: outline of theory
  - The case of 2 attributes
  - More than 2 attributes

# Outline of theory: 2 attributes

### Question

- suppose I can "observe"  $\succeq$  on  $X = X_1 \times X_2$
- what must be supposed to guarantee that I can represent  $\succeq$  in the additive value function model

$$\begin{aligned} v_1: X_1 &\to \mathbb{R} \\ v_2: X_2 &\to \mathbb{R} \\ (x_1, x_2) &\succsim (y_1, y_2) \Leftrightarrow v_1(x_1) + v_2(x_2) \geq v_1(y_1) + v_2(y_2) \end{aligned}$$

 $\bullet \succeq$  must be an independent weak order

#### Method

• try building standard sequences and see if it works!



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## Why an additive model?

#### Answei

- $v_1$  and  $v_2$  will be built so that additivity holds
- equivalent multiplicative model

$$(x_1, x_2) \succsim (y_1, y_2) \Leftrightarrow w_1(x_1)w_2(x_2) \ge w_1(y_1)w_2(y_2)$$
$$w_1 = \exp(v_1)$$
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# Uniqueness

### Important observation

Suppose that there are  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  such that

$$(x_1, x_2) \succsim (y_1, y_2) \Leftrightarrow v_1(x_1) + v_2(x_2) \ge v_1(y_1) + v_2(y_2)$$

If  $\alpha > 0$ 

$$w_1 = \alpha v_1 + \beta_1 \quad w_2 = \alpha v_2 + \beta_2$$

is also a valid representation

### Consequences

- fixing  $v_1(x_1) = v_2(x_2) = 0$  is harmless
- fixing  $v_1(y_1) = 1$  is harmless if  $y_1 \succ_1 x_1$

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### Standard sequences

#### Preliminaries

- choose arbitrarily two levels  $x_1^0, x_1^1 \in X_1$
- make sure that  $x_1^1 \succ_1 x_1^0$
- choose arbitrarily one level  $x_2^0 \in X_2$
- $(x_1^0, x_2^0) \in X$  is the reference point (origin)
- the preference interval  $[x_1^0, x_1^1]$  is the unit

- find a "preference interval" on  $X_2$  that has the same "length" as the reference interval  $[x_1^0,x_1^1]$
- find  $x_2^1$  such that

$$(x_1^0, x_2^1) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^0)$$
 $v_1(x_1^0) + v_2(x_2^1) = v_1(x_1^1) + v_2(x_2^0)$  so that  $v_2(x_2^1) - v_2(x_2^0) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0)$ 

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# Standard sequences

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$$(x_1^0, x_2^1) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^0)$$
$$v_2(x_2^1) - v_2(x_2^0) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0)$$

• it can be supposed that

$$v_1(x_1^0) = v_2(x_2^0) = 0$$
  
 $v_1(x_1^1) = 1$ 

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## Going on

$$(x_1^0, x_2^1) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^0)$$

$$(x_1^0, x_2^2) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^1)$$

$$(x_1^0, x_2^3) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^2)$$

$$\cdots$$

$$(x_1^0, x_2^k) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^{k-1})$$

$$v_2(x_2^1) - v_2(x_2^0) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$

$$v_2(x_2^2) - v_2(x_2^1) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$

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$$\cdots$$

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$$v_2(x_2^k) - v_2(x_2^{k-1}) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$

$$v_2(x_2^k) = 2, v_2(x_2^k) = 3, \dots, v_2(x_2^k) = k$$

### Going on

$$(x_1^0, x_2^1) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^0)$$

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$$\cdots$$

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$$v_2(x_2^1) - v_2(x_2^0) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$


$$v_2(x_2^2) - v_2(x_2^1) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$


$$v_2(x_2^3) - v_2(x_2^2) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$


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
$$v_2(x_2^k) - v_2(x_2^{k-1}) = v_1(x_1^1) - v_1(x_1^0) = 1$$


$$\Rightarrow v_2(x_2^2) = 2, v_2(x_2^3) = 3, \dots, v_2(x_2^k) = k$$











### Standard sequence

#### Archimedean

- implicit hypothesis for length
  - the standard sequence can reach any the length of any object

$$\forall x,y \in \mathbb{R}, \exists n \in \mathbb{N} : x > ny$$

- a similar hypothesis has to hold here
- rough interpretation
  - there are not "infinitely" liked or disliked consequences

$$(x_1^2, x_2^0) \sim (x_1^1, x_2^1)$$

$$(x_1^3, x_2^0) \sim (x_1^2, x_2^1)$$

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
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
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
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







### Thomsen condition


$$(x_1, x_2) \sim (y_1, y_2)$$
  
and  $\Rightarrow (x_1, z_2) \sim (z_1, y_2)$ 



#### Consequence


• there is an additive value function on the grid






### Thomsen condition

$$(x_1, x_2) \sim (y_1, y_2)$$
  
and  $\Rightarrow (x_1, z_2) \sim (z_1, y_2)$ 



### Consequence

• there is an additive value function on the grid



# Summary


- we have defined a "grid"
- there is an additive value function on the grid
- iterate the whole process with a "denser grid"


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
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# Hypotheses

- Archimedean: every strictly bounded standard sequence is finite
- essentiality: both  $\succ_1$  and  $\succ_2$  are nontrivial
- restricted solvability







### Basic result

### Theorem (2 attributes)

If

- restricted solvability holds
- each attribute is essential

then

the additive value function model holds

if and only if

≿ is an independent weak order satisfying the Thomsen and the Archimedean conditions

The representation is unique up to scale and location

### General case

#### Good news

- entirely similar...
- with a very nice surprise: Thomsen can be forgotten
  - if n=2, independence is identical with weak independence
  - if n > 3, independence is much stronger than weak independence

 $X_1$ : % of nights at home  $X_2$ : attractiveness of city  $X_3$ : salary increase weak independence holds  $\succ b$  and  $d \succ c$  is reasonable

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	$X_1$	$X_2$	$X_3$
$\overline{a}$	75	10	0
b	100	2	0
c	75	10	40
d	100	$^2$	40

 $X_1$ : % of nights at home  $X_2$ : attractiveness of city  $X_3$ : salary increase

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## Basic result

### Theorem (more than 2 attributes)

If

- restricted solvability holds
- at least three attributes are essential

then

the additive value function model holds if and only if

 $\succsim$  is an independent weak order satisfying the Archimedean condition

The representation is unique up to scale and location

# Independence and even swaps

### Even swaps technique

- assessing tradeoffs...
- after having suppressed attributes

### Implicit hypothesis

- what happens on these attributes do not influence tradeoffs
- this is another way to formulate independence

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## Part II

A glimpse at possible extensions

# Summary

### Additive value function model

- requires independence
- requires a finely grained analysis of preferences

### Two main types of extensions

- models with interactions
- @ more ordinal models

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### Additive value function model

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## Outline

- 6 Models with interactions
  - Rough sets
  - GAI networks
  - Fuzzy integrals
- 6 Ordinal models

## Interactions

#### Two extreme models

- additive value function model
  - independence
- decomposable model
  - only weak independence

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i(x_i) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i(y_i)$$
$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow F[v_1(x_1), \dots v_n(x_n)] \ge F[v_1(y_1), \dots v_n(y_n)]$$

# Decomposable models

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow F[v_1(x_1), \dots v_n(x_n)] \ge F[v_1(y_1), \dots v_n(y_n)]$$
  
 $F$  increasing in all arguments

#### Result

Under mild conditions, any weakly independent weak order may be represented in the decomposable model

#### Problem.

- all possible types of interactions are admitted
- assessment is a very challenging task

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Under mild conditions, any weakly independent weak order may be represented in the decomposable model

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## Two main directions

#### Extensions

- work with the decomposable model
  - rough sets
- 2 find models "in between additive" and decomposable
  - CP-nets, GAI
  - fuzzy integrals

## Rough sets

#### Basic ideas

- work within the general decomposable model
- use the same principle as in UTA
- replacing the numerical model by a symbolic one
- infer decision rules

IF 
$$x_1 \geq a_1, \dots, x_i \geq a_i, \dots, x_n \geq a_n$$
 and  $y_1 \leq b_1, \dots, y_i \leq b_i, \dots, y_n \leq b_n$  Then  $x \succsim y$ 

- many possible variants
- Greco, Matarazzo, Słowiński

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# GAI: Example

#### Choice of a meal: 3 attributes

 $X_1 = \{ \text{Steak}, \text{Fish} \}$   $X_2 = \{ \text{Red}, \text{White} \}$  $X_3 = \{ \text{Cake}, \text{sherBet} \}$ 

### Preferences

$$x^{1} = (S, R, C)$$
  $x^{2} = (S, R, B)$   $x^{3} = (S, W, C)$   $x^{4} = (S, W, B)$   
 $x^{5} = (F, R, C)$   $x^{6} = (F, R, B)$   $x^{7} = (F, W, C)$   $x^{8} = (F, W, B)$ 

$$x^2 \succ x^1 \succ x^7 \succ x^8 \succ x^4 \succ x^3 \succ x^5 \succ x^6$$

- the important is to match main course and wine
- I prefer Steak to Fish
- I prefer Cake to sherBet if Fish
- I prefer sherBet to Cake if Steak

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### Independence

$$x^1 \succ x^5 \Rightarrow v_1(S) > v_1(F)$$
  
 $x^7 \succ x^3 \Rightarrow v_1(F) > v_1(S)$ 

#### Grouping main course and wine?

$$x^7 \succ x^8 \Rightarrow v_3(C) > v_3(B)$$
  
 $x^2 \succ x^1 \Rightarrow v_3(B) > v_3(C)$ 

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#### Model

$$x \gtrsim y \Leftrightarrow u_{12}(x_1, x_2) + u_{13}(x_1, x_3) \ge u_{12}(y_1, y_2) + u_{13}(y_1, y_3)$$

$$u_{12}(S,R) = 6$$
  $u_{12}(F,W) = 4$   $u_{12}(S,W) = 2$   $u_{12}(F,R) = 0$   
 $u_{13}(S,C) = 0$   $u_{13}(S,B) = 1$   $u_{13}(F,C) = 1$   $u_{13}(F,S) = 0$ 



$$\begin{split} x^1 &= (S,R,C) \quad x^2 = (S,R,B) \quad x^3 = (S,W,C) \quad x^4 = (S,W,B) \\ x^5 &= (F,R,C) \quad x^6 = (F,R,B) \quad x^7 = (F,W,C) \quad x^8 = (F,W,B) \end{split}$$

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### GAI (Gonzales & Perny)

- axiomatic analysis
- if interdependences are known
  - assessment techniques
  - efficient algorithms (compactness of representation)
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## Fuzzy integrals

### Origins

- decision making under uncertainty
  - homogeneous Cartesian product
- mathematics
  - integrating w.r.t. a non-additive measure
- game theory
  - cooperative TU games
- multiattribute decisions
  - generalizing the weighted sum

	Physics	Maths	Economics
$\overline{a}$	18	12	6
b	18	7	11
c	5	17	8
d	5	12	13

 $a \succ b$   $d \succ c$ 

#### Preferences

a is fine for Engineering d is fine for Economics

#### Interpretation: interaction

- having good grades in both
  - Math and Physics or
  - Maths and Economics
- better than having good grades in both
  - Physics and Economics



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# Weighted sum

	Physics	Maths	Economics
a	18	12	6
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d	5	12	13

$$a \succ b \Rightarrow 18w_1 + 12w_2 + 6w_3 > 18w_1 + 7w_2 + 11w_3 \Rightarrow w_2 > w_3$$
  
 $d \succ c \Rightarrow 5w_1 + 17w_2 + 8w_3 > 5w_1 + 12w_2 + 13w_3 \Rightarrow w_3 > w_2$ 

# Choquet integral

## Capacity

$$\mu: 2^N \to [0,1]$$
  

$$\mu(\varnothing) = 0, \mu(N) = 1$$
  

$$A \subseteq B \Rightarrow \mu(A) \le \mu(B)$$

# Choquet integral

$$0 = x_{(0)} \le x_{(1)} \le \dots \le x_{(n)}$$

$$x_{(1)} - x_{(0)} \quad \mu(\{(1), (2), (3), (4) \dots, (n)\})$$

$$x_{(2)} - x_{(1)} \qquad \mu(\{(2), (3), (4) \dots, (n)\})$$

$$x_{(3)} - x_{(2)} \qquad \mu(\{(3), (4) \dots, (n)\})$$

$$\dots \qquad \dots \qquad \dots$$

$$(n) - x_{(n-1)} \qquad \mu(\{(n)\})$$

$$C_{\mu}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ x_{(i)} - x_{(i-1)} \right] \mu(A_{(i)})$$
$$A_{(i)} = \{ (i), (i+1), \dots, (n) \}$$

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# Application

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$$C_{\mu}(c) = 5 + (8 - 5) \times 1 + (17 - 8) \times 0.1 = 8.9$$

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# Choquet integral in MCDM

### Properties

- monotone, idempotent, continuous
- preserves weak separability
- tolerates violation of independence
- contains many other aggregation functions as particular cases

### Capacities

Fascinating mathematical object:

- Möbius transform
- Shapley value
- interaction indices

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## Questions

### Hypotheses

- I can compare  $x_i$  with  $x_j$ 
  - attributes are (level) commensurable

#### Classical model

• I can indirectly compare  $[x_i, y_i]$  with  $[x_j, y_j]$ 

### Central research question

• how to assess  $u: \bigcup_{i=1}^n X_i \to \mathbb{R}$  so that the levels are commensurate?

# Questions

### Hypotheses

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  - attributes are (level) commensurable

#### Classical model

• I can indirectly compare  $[x_i, y_i]$  with  $[x_j, y_j]$ 

### Central research question

• how to assess  $u: \bigcup_{i=1}^n X_i \to \mathbb{R}$  so that the levels are commensurate?

## Questions

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### Assessment

• variety of mathematical programming based approaches

#### Extensions

- Choquet integral with a reference point (statu quo)
- Sugeno integral (median)
- axiomatization as aggregation functions
- k-additive capacities

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## Outline

- 6 Models with interactions
- 6 Ordinal models

## Observations

#### Classical model

- deep analysis of preference that may not be possible
  - preference are not well structured
  - several or no DM
  - prudence

#### Idea

- it is not very restrictive to suppose that levels on each  $X_i$  can be ordered
- aggregate these orders
- possibly taking importance into account

#### Social choice

• aggregate the preference orders of the voters to build a collective preference

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# Outranking methods

#### ELECTRE

 $x \succeq y$  if

Concordance a "majority" of attributes support the assertion Discordance the opposition of the minority is not "too strong"

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_{i:x_i \succsim_i y_i} w_i \geq s \\ \\ Not[y_i \ V_i \ x_i], \forall i \in N \end{array} \right.$$

$$\begin{aligned} x \succsim y &\Leftrightarrow |\{i \in N : x_i \succsim_i y_i\}| \geq |\{i \in N : y_i \succsim_i x_i\}| \\ &1 : x_1 \succ_1 y_1 \succ_1 z_1 \\ &2 : z_2 \succ_2 x_2 \succ_2 y_2 \\ &3 : y_3 \succ_3 z_3 \succ_3 x_3 \\ &x = (x_1, x_2, x_3) \\ &y = (y_1, y_2, y_3) \end{aligned}$$

 $z = (z_1, z_2, z_3)$ 

$$x \gtrsim y \Leftrightarrow |\{i \in N : x_i \gtrsim_i y_i\}| \ge |\{i \in N : y_i \gtrsim_i x_i\}|$$

$$1 : x_1 \succ_1 y_1 \succ_1 z_1$$

$$2 : z_2 \succ_2 x_2 \succ_2 y_2$$

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$$(z)$$



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
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
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The only ways to aggregate weak orders while remaining ordinal are not very attractive. . .

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# Ways out

### Accepting intransitivity

- find way to extract information in spite of intransitivity
  - ELECTRE I, II, III, IS
  - PROMETHEE I, II

### Do not use paired comparisons

- only compare x with carefully selected alternatives
  - ELECTRE TRI
  - methods using reference points

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### Conclusion

### Fascinating field

- theoretical point of view
  - measurement theory
  - decision under uncertainty
  - social choice theory
- practical point of view
  - rating firms from a social point of view
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