

# A Genuine Rank-dependent Generalization of von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility

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# Outline

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- I. Review and Motivation
- II. Probability Tradeoffs
- III. Probability Tradeoff Consistency
- IV. Cumulative Prospect Theory
- V. Concluding Remarks

# I. Review and Motivation

## Experimental Findings

Preston & Baratta (1948), *AJP*

The authors explored whether subjects accounted for chance events at their true mathematical probabilities.

Edwards (1954), *PR*

The author observed that subject's bets revealed preferences among probabilities.

# I. Review and Motivation

## The First Models

Handa (1977), *JPE*

$$\sum_i w(p_i)u(x_i)$$

⇒ Violation of First Order Stochastic  
Dominance

# I. Review and Motivation

Kahneman & Tversky (1979)

## Prospect Theory

The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes cannot be explained by the utility function for money

	<b>GAINS</b>	<b>LOSSES</b>
<b>Low Probability</b>	<b>Risk seeking</b>	<b>Risk aversion</b>
<b>High Probability</b>	<b>Risk aversion</b>	<b>Risk seeking</b>

# I. Review and Motivation

Quiggin (1982)

## Rank-dependent EU Theory

An enhanced version of prospect theory  
avoiding violations of FSD.

It takes into account an additional behavioral  
rule:

*The attention given to an outcome depends not only on the probability of the outcome but also on the favorability of the outcome in comparison to the other outcomes .*

# I. Review and Motivation

## Illustration

Assume that a decision maker is a pessimist and evaluates the lottery


$(30\$, 1/3 ; 20\$, 1/3 ; 10\$, 1/3)$ .

The DM will pay more attention ( $\pi_3$ ) than  $1/3$  to the worst outcome 10. Say that the decision weight for outcome 10 is  $\pi_3=1/2$ .

The DM, accordingly, pays relatively less attention to the other outcomes ( $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1/2$ ). Being a pessimist, he will pay more than half of the remaining attention to outcome 20; say  $\pi_2 = 1/3$ . The remainder of the attention, devoted to the best outcome, is small ( $1/6$ ).

# I. Review and Motivation

## The Common Probability Weighting Function



- Tversky & Kahneman (1992), *JRU*

- Wu & Gonzalez (1996), *Management Science*

- Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000)

- Abdellaoui (2000) *Management Science*



# I. Review and Motivation

## Existing Axiomatizations of RDEU

- Rank-dependent Expected Utility

$P = (p_1 : x_1; \dots; p_n : x_n)$  with  $x_n \succcurlyeq x_{n-1} \succcurlyeq \dots \succcurlyeq x_1$



$$RDU(P) = \sum_i \pi_i u(x_i)$$

$$\pi_i = w(p_n + \dots + p_i) - w(p_n + \dots + p_{i-1})$$

- Outcome-oriented Axiomatizations of RDEU: Quiggin (1982), Segal (1989), Chew (1989), Wakker (1994), Chateauneuf (1995), Nakamura (1995)
- No obvious link with the von Neumann Morgenstern axiomatic set-up.

# I. Review and Motivation

## RDEU and the Allais Paradox



# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Preliminaries

### Measuring Utility from Mixtures

$M$  is a mixture set

$$\forall \alpha \in [0, 1], \forall x, y \in M : \alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in M$$

$x, y, z$  are three consequences in  $M$  such that

If

$$x \succ y \succ z$$

Then ...


$$y \succ \frac{1}{2}x + \frac{1}{2}z$$

# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Measuring Utility from Tradeoffs

Let  $D = X^2$  a set of alternatives and  $\preceq$  a preference relation.

$\sim$  : indifference      and       $<$  : strict preference



# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Revealed Tradeoffs

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (\gamma, a) \sim (\delta, a') \\ (\alpha, a) \sim (\beta, a') \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow^{def} [\alpha\beta] \sim^t [\gamma\delta]$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (\gamma, a) \preceq (\delta, a') \\ (\alpha, a) \succeq (\beta, a') \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow^{def} [\alpha\beta] \succ^t [\gamma\delta]$$

## II. Probability Tradeoffs

$$x_n \succcurlyeq x_{n-1} \succcurlyeq \dots \succcurlyeq x_1$$


$$p_i^* = \sum_{j=i}^n p_j$$

Probability of receiving  $x_i$  or any better outcome.

# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Probability/Rank-ordered Triangle

$$x_3 \geq x_2 \geq x_1 \quad P = (p_1, p_3) \quad P^* = (p_2^*, p_3^*)$$



## II. Probability Tradeoffs

### DEFINITION

For probabilities  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$  we write  $[\alpha \beta] \succcurlyeq_t [\gamma \delta]$  if

$$(\alpha, P^{*-i}) \succcurlyeq (\beta, Q^{*-i}) \quad \text{and}$$


$$(\gamma, P^{*-i}) \preccurlyeq (\delta, Q^{*-i})$$

for some rank-ordered set  $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$  and  $I \in \{2, \dots, n\}$  such that  $x_i \succ x_{i-1}$  and  $P^*, Q^* \in \mathbb{P}$ .



# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Derived Probability Tradeoffs



- **OBSERVATION:**

Under EU we have

$$[\alpha \beta] \sim^t [\gamma \delta]$$




$$\alpha - \beta = \gamma - \delta$$

# II. Probability Tradeoffs

Allais Paradox: $x_1 = 0$ , $x_2 = 1M$ , $x_3 = 5M$		
	Alternatives in P	Alternatives in P*
Problem 1	$P = (0, 1, 0)$ $Q = (0.01, 0.89, 0.1)$	$P^* = (1, 0)$ $Q^* = (0.99, 0.10)$
Problem 2	$R = (0.89, 0.11, 0)$ $S = (0.90, 0, 0.10)$	$R^* = (0.11, 0.10)$ $S^* = (0.10, 0.10)$

# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Allais Paradox (once again!)




• CONCLUSION:

$$[1; 0.99] \succ^t [0.11; 0.10]$$

# II. Probability Tradeoffs

## Other Experimental Findings



# III. Tradeoff Consistency

## Rank-dependent Expected Utility

$$EU(P) = u_1 + [u_2 - u_1]p_2^* + [u_3 - u_2]p_3^*$$



$$RDU(P) = u_1 + [u_2 - u_1]w(p_2^*) + [u_3 - u_2]w(p_3^*)$$


**LEMMA:** Under RDEU

$$[\alpha\beta] \sim^t [\gamma\delta] \Rightarrow w(\alpha) - w(\beta) = w(\gamma) - w(\delta)$$

$$[\alpha\beta] \succ^t [\gamma\delta] \Rightarrow w(\alpha) - w(\beta) > w(\gamma) - w(\delta)$$

# III. Tradeoff Consistency

## Probability Tradeoff Consistency



# III. Tradeoff Consistency

## MAIN THEOREM

Let  $\succsim$  be a preference relation on  $\mathbb{P}$ . Then the following two statements are equivalent:

- (i) RDU holds on  $\mathbb{P}$ ;
- (ii) The following conditions are satisfied
  - a.  $\succsim$  is a weak order on  $\mathbb{P}$ ;
  - b.  $\succsim$  satisfies FSD;
  - c.  $\succsim$  is Jensen continuous;
  - d.  $\succsim$  satisfies tradeoff consistency.

# III. Tradeoff Consistency

## PROPOSITION

Let  $\succsim$  be a vNM-independent weak order on  $\mathbb{P}$ .  
Then:

- (i)  $\succsim$  satisfies FSD;
- (ii)  $[\alpha \beta] \succsim_t [\gamma \delta] \Rightarrow w(\alpha) - w(\beta) \geq w(\gamma) - w(\delta)$ ;
- (iii)  $[\alpha \beta] \succ_t [\gamma \delta] \Rightarrow w(\alpha) - w(\beta) > w(\gamma) - w(\delta)$ ;
- (iv)  $[\alpha \beta] \sim_t [\gamma \delta] \Rightarrow w(\alpha) - w(\beta) = w(\gamma) - w(\delta)$ ;
- (v)  $\succsim$  satisfies tradeoff consistency.



# III. Tradeoff Consistency


## COROLLARY (vNM Theorem, 1944)

Let  $\succsim$  be a preference relation on  $\mathbb{P}$ . Expected Utility holds if and only if:

- (i)  $\succsim$  is a weak order;
- (ii)  $\succsim$  is Jensen continuous;
- (iii)  $\succsim$  is vNM-independent.

# IV. Cumulative Prospect Theory


## Utility under CPT (Diminishing sensitivity)









# IV. Cumulative Prospect Theory

- Utility function for gains and losses;
- Utility is concave for gains and convex for losses with  $u(0)=0$ ;
- Utility steeper for losses than for gains (near 0);
- Two probability weighting functions: gains and losses.

# IV. Cumulative Prospect Theory



motivational



cognitive

Abdellaoui (2000); Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000); Gonzalez & Wu 1999; Tversky & Fox, 1997.

# IV. Probabilistic Risk Attitude

## « Pratt-Arrow » for Probabilistic Risk

### THEOREM

Suppose that RDEU holds for  $\succsim$ ,  $w_i, u_i, i = 1, 2$ . Then the following two statements are equivalent :


- (i)  $w_2 \succ w_1$  for a continuous, convex (respectively concave), strictly increasing  $w: [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$
- (ii)  $\succsim$  is more averse (respectively prone) to probabilistic risk than  $\succsim$ .

### Definition

$\succsim$  exhibits *probabilistic risk aversion* if  $\succsim$  is excluded for all probabilities considered with  $\succsim$ .

# IV. Probabilistic Risk Attitude

## COROLLARY

Under RDEU,  $w$  is convex (concave, linear) if and only if  exhibits probabilistic risk aversion (proneness, both aversion and proneness).

# V. Concluding Remarks

## Contributions:

This paper provides the first genuine generalization of the vNM EU theorem. Its techniques are immediately directed towards the non-linear processing of probabilities.

Its techniques allow for straightforward testing and elicitation of RDEU.