Nos tutelles

CNRS Dauphine PSL *

Rechercher





Accueil > PERSONNES

Membres

publié le , mis à jour le

Sanver M. Remzi ne figure pas dans la base




retour a la liste des membres

M. Remzi Sanver

Email : remzi.sanver@dauphine.fr

Tel : 0144054551
Bureau : P647
Site Personnel: http://sanver.bilgi.edu.tr
Pole : Aide à la décision
Status : Directeur de Recherche

Encadrement de these de doctorat :


    voir toutes les theses

    Publications Dblp


    • Sinan Ertemel, Levent Kutlu, M. Remzi Sanver
      Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences.Social Choice and Welfare45(1) 2015:187-201

    • Bora Erdamar, José Luis García-Lapresta, David Pérez-Román, M. Remzi Sanver
      Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context.Information Fusion17 2014:14-21

    • Ceyhun Coban, M. Remzi Sanver
      Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence.Social Choice and Welfare43(4) 2014:953-961

    • Shurojit Chatterji, M. Remzi Sanver, Arunava Sen
      On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions.J. Economic Theory148(3) 2013:1050-1073

    • Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba
      On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives.Mathematical Social Sciences64(1) 2012:67-73

    • M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker
      Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules.Social Choice and Welfare39(2-3) 2012:371-398

    • Edith Elkind, Christian Klamler, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, M. Remzi Sanver
      Computation and Incentives in Social Choice (Dagstuhl Seminar 12101).Dagstuhl Reports2(3) 2012:1-22

    • Selçuk Özyurt, M. Remzi Sanver
      A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions.Games and Economic Behavior66(2) 2009:880-892

    • M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker
      One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness.Int. J. Game Theory38(4) 2009:553-574

    • Burak Can, M. Remzi Sanver
      Stereotype formation as trait aggregation.Mathematical Social Sciences58(2) 2009:226-237

    • M. Remzi Sanver, Özer Selçuk
      Sophisticated preference aggregation.Social Choice and Welfare33(1) 2009:73-86

    • M. Remzi Sanver
      Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach.Social Choice and Welfare33(1) 2009:159-171

    • Selçuk Özyurt, M. Remzi Sanver
      Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences.Social Choice and Welfare30(1) 2008:89-101

    • Emre Dogan, M. Remzi Sanver
      Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes.Social Choice and Welfare30(3) 2008:495-506

    • Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok, M. Remzi Sanver
      On combining implementable social choice rules.Games and Economic Behavior60(1) 2007:20-30

    • M. Remzi Sanver
      A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions.Mathematical Social Sciences54(3) 2007:257-260

    • Ugur Ozdemir, M. Remzi Sanver
      Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation.Social Choice and Welfare28(1) 2007:61-76

    • Murat Ali Çengelci, M. Remzi Sanver
      Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?Social Choice and Welfare28(3) 2007:439-442

    • Ipek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver
      Nash implementation via hyperfunctions.Social Choice and Welfare26(3) 2006:607-623

    • Ipek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver
      Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting.Social Choice and Welfare27(1) 2006:211-219

    • Ipek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver
      Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms.Mathematical Social Sciences50(3) 2005:304-317

    • Orhan Erdem, M. Remzi Sanver
      Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules.Social Choice and Welfare25(1) 2005:31-42

    • Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver
      Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners.Social Choice and Welfare22(2) 2004:331-347

    • Baris Kaymak, M. Remzi Sanver
      Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners.Social Choice and Welfare20(3) 2003:477-494

    • M. Remzi Sanver
      Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously.Mathematical Social Sciences43(2) 2002:151-155



    Publications DFIS


    Publications HAL