

Cooperative Games

Lecture 5: The nucleolus

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Today

- We consider one way to compare two imputations.
- We define the Nucleolus and look at some properties.
- We prove important properties of the nucleolus, which requires some elements of analysis.

Excess of a coalition

Definition (Excess of a coalition)

Let (N, v) be a TU game, $\mathcal{C} \subseteq N$ be a coalition, and x be a payoff distribution over N . The **excess** $e(\mathcal{C}, x)$ of coalition \mathcal{C} at x is the quantity $e(\mathcal{C}, x) = v(\mathcal{C}) - x(\mathcal{C})$.

An example: let $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$, $\mathcal{C} = \{1, 2\}$, $v(\{1, 2\}) = 8$, $x = \langle 3, 2, 5 \rangle$, $e(\mathcal{C}, x) = v(\{1, 2\}) - (x_1 + x_2) = 8 - (3 + 2) = 3$.

We can interpret a positive excess ($e(\mathcal{C}, x) \geq 0$) as the amount of **dissatisfaction** or **complaint** of the members of \mathcal{C} from the allocation x .

We can use the excess to define the core:

$$\text{Core}(N, v) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid x \text{ is an imputation and } \forall \mathcal{C} \subseteq N, e(\mathcal{C}, x) \leq 0\}$$

This definition shows that no coalition has any complaint: each coalition's demand can be granted.

$$\begin{aligned}
 N &= \{1,2,3\}, v(\{i\}) = 0 \text{ for } i \in \{1,2,3\} \\
 v(\{1,2\}) &= 5, v(\{1,3\}) = 6, v(\{2,3\}) = 6 \\
 v(N) &= 8
 \end{aligned}$$

Let us consider two payoff vectors $x = \langle 3, 3, 2 \rangle$ and $y = \langle 2, 3, 3 \rangle$.
 Let $e(x)$ denote the sequence of **excesses** of all coalitions at x .

$$x = \langle 3, 3, 2 \rangle$$

coalition \mathcal{C}	$e(\mathcal{C}, x)$
$\{1\}$	-3
$\{2\}$	-3
$\{3\}$	-2
$\{1, 2\}$	-1
$\{1, 3\}$	1
$\{2, 3\}$	1
$\{1, 2, 3\}$	0

$$y = \langle 2, 3, 3 \rangle$$

coalition \mathcal{C}	$e(\mathcal{C}, y)$
$\{1\}$	-2
$\{2\}$	-3
$\{3\}$	-3
$\{1, 2\}$	0
$\{1, 3\}$	1
$\{2, 3\}$	0
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$$y = \langle 2, 3, 3 \rangle$$

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$\{3\}$	-3
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$\{1, 3\}$	1
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Which payoff should we prefer? x or y ? Let us write the excess in the decreasing order (from the greatest excess to the smallest)

$$\langle 1, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -3 \rangle$$

$$\langle 1, 0, 0, 0, -2, -3, -3 \rangle$$

Definition (lexicographical order of $\mathbb{R}^m \succcurlyeq_{lex}$)

Let \succcurlyeq_{lex} denote the **lexicographical** ordering of \mathbb{R}^m ,

i.e., $\forall (x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^m$, $x \succcurlyeq_{lex} y$ iff

$$\begin{cases} x=y \text{ or} \\ \exists t \text{ s. t. } 1 \leq t \leq m \text{ and } \forall i \text{ s. t. } 1 \leq i < t \ x_i = y_i \text{ and } x_t > y_t \end{cases}$$

example: $\langle 1, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -3 \rangle \succcurlyeq_{lex} \langle 1, 0, 0, 0, -2, -3, -3 \rangle$

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Let l be a sequence of m reals. We denote by l^\blacktriangleright the **reordering** of l in **decreasing** order.

In the example, $e(x) = \langle -3, -3, -2, -1, 1, 1, 0 \rangle$ and then
 $e(x)^\blacktriangleright = \langle 1, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -3 \rangle$.

Hence, we can say that y is better than x by writing

$$e(x)^\blacktriangleright \succcurlyeq_{lex} e(y)^\blacktriangleright.$$

Some properties of \leq_{lex} and its strict version

- $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}^m \ x \leq_{lex} x \blacktriangleright$
- $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and any permutation σ of $\{1, \dots, m\}$, $\sigma(x) \leq_{lex} x \blacktriangleright$
- $\forall x, y, u, v \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and $\alpha > 0$
 - $x \leq_{lex} y \Rightarrow \alpha x \leq_{lex} \alpha y$
 - $x <_{lex} y \Rightarrow \alpha x <_{lex} \alpha y$
 - $(x \leq_{lex} y \wedge u \leq_{lex} v) \Rightarrow x + u \leq_{lex} y + v$
 - $(x <_{lex} y \wedge u \leq_{lex} v) \Rightarrow x + u <_{lex} y + v$
 - $x \leq_{lex} y$ we **cannot** conclude anything for the comparison between $-\alpha x$ and $-\alpha y$.

Definition (Nucleolus)

Let (N, v) be a TU game.

Let $\mathcal{I}mp$ be the set of all imputations.

The **nucleolus** $Nu(N, v)$ is the set

$$Nu(N, v) = \{x \in \mathcal{I}mp \mid \forall y \in \mathcal{I}mp \ e(y) \blacktriangleright \geq_{lex} e(x) \blacktriangleright\}$$

An alternative definition in terms of objections and counter-objections

Let (N, v) be a TU game. **Objections** are made by **coalitions** instead of individual agents. Let $P \subseteq N$ be a coalition that expresses an objection.

A pair (P, y) , in which $P \subseteq N$ and y is an imputation, is an **objection** to x iff $e(P, x) > e(P, y)$.

Our excess for coalition P is too large at x , payoff y reduces it.

A coalition (Q, y) is a **counter-objection** to the objection (P, y) when $e(Q, y) > e(Q, x)$ and $e(Q, y) \geq e(P, x)$.

Our excess under y is larger than it was under x for coalition Q ! Furthermore, our excess at y is larger than what your excess was at x !

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An imputation fails to be stable when the excess of some coalition P can be reduced without increasing the excess of some other coalition to a level at least as large as that of the original excess of P .

Definition (Nucleolus)

Let (N, v) be a TU game. The **nucleolus** is the set of imputations x such that for every objection (P, y) , there exists a counter-objection (Q, y) .

M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. **A course in game theory**, MIT Press, 1994, Section 14.3.3.

Definition (ϵ -core)

A payoff distribution is in the ϵ -core of the superadditive game (N, v) for some $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ if $x(C) \geq v(C) - \epsilon$.

Definition (least-core)

Let $\epsilon^*(G) = \inf\{\epsilon \in \mathbb{R} \mid \epsilon\text{-core of } G \text{ is non-empty}\}$

The **least-core** of G is the $\epsilon^*(G)$ -core.

$$(LP) \quad \begin{cases} \text{minimize } \epsilon \\ \text{subject to } \begin{cases} x_i \geq 0 \text{ for each } i \in N \\ \sum_{j \in N} x_j = v(N) \\ \sum_{j \in C} x_j \geq v(C) - \epsilon \text{ for each } C \subseteq N \end{cases} \end{cases}$$

Definition (Nucleolus)

A payoff vector x is in the nucleolus of the game (N, v) if it is the solution of optimization programs $O_1, \dots, O_{|N|}$ where these programs are defined recursively as follows:

$$(O_1) \begin{cases} \text{minimize } \epsilon \\ \text{subject to } \sum_{i \in S} x_i \geq v(S) - \epsilon \quad \forall S \subset N \end{cases}$$

$$(O_i) \begin{cases} \text{minimize } \epsilon \\ \text{subject to } \begin{cases} \sum_{j \in S} x_j \geq v(S) - \epsilon_0 \quad \forall S \in S_1 \\ \vdots \\ \sum_{j \in S} x_j \geq v(S) - \epsilon_{i-1} \quad \forall S \in S_{i-1} \setminus S_{i-2} \\ \sum_{j \in S} x_j \geq v(S) - \epsilon \quad \forall S \in 2^N \setminus S_{i-1} \end{cases} \end{cases}$$

where ϵ_{i-1} is the optimal objective value to program O_{i-1} and S_{i-1} is the set of coalitions for which the constraints are realized as equalities in the optimal solution to O_{i-1} .

Theorem

Let (N, v) be a TU game with a non-empty core. Then
 $Nu(N, v) \subseteq Core(N, v)$

Proof

This will be part of homework 2



Theorem

Let (N, v) be a superadditive game and Imp be its set of imputations. Then, $\text{Imp} \neq \emptyset$.

Proof

Let (N, v) be a superadditive game.

Let x be a payoff distribution defined as follows:

$$x_i = v(\{i\}) + \frac{1}{|N|} \left(v(N) - \sum_{j \in N} v(\{j\}) \right).$$

- $v(N) - \sum_{j \in N} v(\{j\}) > 0$ since (N, v) is superadditive.
- It is clear x is individually rational ✓
- It is clear x is efficient ✓

Hence, $x \in \text{Imp}$.



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Hence, $x \in \text{Imp}$.



Theorem (Non-emptiness of the nucleolus)

Let (N, v) be a TU game, if $\text{Imp} \neq \emptyset$,
then the nucleolus $\text{Nu}(N, v)$ is **non-empty**.

Element of Analysis

Let $E = \mathbb{R}^m$ and $X \subseteq E$. $\|\cdot\|$ denote a distance in E , e.g., the euclidean distance.

We consider functions of the form $u: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$. Another view-point on u is an infinite **sequence** of elements indexed by natural numbers $(u_0, u_1, \dots, u_k, \dots)$ where $u_i \in X$.

- **convergent sequence:** A sequence (u_t) converges to $l \in \mathbb{R}^m$ iff for all $\epsilon > 0$, $\exists T \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\forall t \geq T$, $\|u_t - l\| \leq \epsilon$.
- **extracted sequence:** Let (u_t) be an infinite sequence and $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be a monotonically increasing function. The sequence v is extracted from u iff $v = u \circ f$, i.e., $v_t = u_{f(t)}$.
- **closed set:** a set X is closed if and only if it contains all of its limit points.
i.e. for all converging sequences (x_0, x_1, \dots) of elements in X , the limit of the sequence has to be in X as well.
An example: if $X = (0, 1]$, $(1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4}, \dots, \frac{1}{n}, \dots)$ is a converging sequence. However, 0 is not in X , and hence, X is not closed.
“A closed set contains its borders”.

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Element of Analysis

- **bounded set:** A subset $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ is **bounded** if it is contained in a ball of finite radius, i.e. $\exists c \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and $\exists r \in \mathbb{R}^+$ s.t. $\forall x \in X \ \|x - c\| \leq r$.
- **compact set:** A subset $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ is a **compact** set iff from all sequences in X , we can extract a convergent sequence in X .
- ⇒ A set is **compact** set of \mathbb{R}^m iff it is **closed** and **bounded**.
- **convex set:** A set X is convex iff $\forall (x, y) \in X^2, \forall \alpha \in [0, 1], \alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in X$ (i.e. all points in a line from x to y is contained in X).
- **continuous function:** Let $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n, f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$.
 f is **continuous at** $x_0 \in X$ iff $\forall \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}, \epsilon > 0, \exists \delta \in \mathbb{R}, \delta > 0$ s.t. $\forall x \in X$ s.t. $\|x - x_0\| < \delta$, we have $\|f(x) - f(x_0)\| < \epsilon$, i.e. $\forall \epsilon > 0 \ \exists \delta > 0 \ \forall x \in X \ \|x - x_0\| < \delta \Rightarrow \|f(x) - f(x_0)\| < \epsilon$.

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Let $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$.

Thm A₁ If $f: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ is continuous and $X \subseteq E$ is a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n ,
then $f(X)$ is a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m .

Thm A₂ Extreme value theorem: Let X be a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n , $f: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ a **continuous** function.
Then f is bounded and it reaches its supremum.

Thm A₃ Let X be a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n . $f: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous iff for every closed subset $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, the set $f^{-1}(B)$ is compact.

Proof of non-emptiness of the nucleolus

Assume we have the following theorems 1 and 2 (we will prove them in the next slide).

Theorem (1)

Let A be a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m .
 $\{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A \ x \leq_{lex} y\}$ is non-empty.

Theorem (2)

Assume we have a TU game (N, v) , and consider its set Imp .
If $Imp \neq \emptyset$, then set $B = \{e(x) \blacktriangleright \mid x \in Imp\}$ is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$

Let us take a TU game (N, v) and let us assume $Imp \neq \emptyset$. Then B in theorem 2 is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$. Now let A in theorem 1 be B in theorem 2. So

$\{e(x) \blacktriangleright \mid (x \in Imp) \wedge (\forall y \in Imp \ e(x) \blacktriangleright \leq_{lex} e(y) \blacktriangleright)\}$ is non-empty. From this, it follows that:

$Nu(N, v) = \{x \in Imp \mid \forall y \in Imp \ e(y) \blacktriangleright \geq_{lex} e(x) \blacktriangleright\} \neq \emptyset. \checkmark$

Proof of theorem 2

Let (N, v) be a TU game and consider its set Imp . Let us assume that $\text{Imp} \neq \emptyset$ to prove that $B = \{e(x)^\blacktriangleright \mid x \in \text{Imp}\}$ is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$.

First, let us prove that Imp is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{|N|}$.

- Imp non-empty by assumption.
- To see that Imp is bounded, we need to show that for all i , x_i is bounded by some constant (independent of x). We have $v(\{i\}) \leq x_i$ (ind. rational) and $x(N) = v(N)$ (efficient). Then $x_i + \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^n v(\{j\}) \leq v(N)$, hence $x_i \leq v(N) - \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^n v(\{j\})$.
- Imp is closed (the boundaries of Imp are members of Imp).

This proves that Imp is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{|N|}$.

Thm A₁ If $f : E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ is continuous, $X \subseteq E$ is a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n , then $f(X)$ is a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m .

$e(\cdot)^\blacktriangleright$ is a continuous function and Imp is a non-empty and compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$. Using thm A₁, $e(\text{Imp})^\blacktriangleright = \{e(x)^\blacktriangleright \mid x \in \text{Imp}\}$ is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$.

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Proof of theorem 2

Let (N, v) be a TU game and consider its set Imp . Let us assume that $\text{Imp} \neq \emptyset$ to prove that $B = \{e(x)^\blacktriangleright \mid x \in \text{Imp}\}$ is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$.

First, let us prove that Imp is a non-empty compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^{|N|}$.

- Imp non-empty by assumption.
- To see that Imp is bounded, we need to show that for all i , x_i is bounded by some constant (independent of x). We have $v(\{i\}) \leq x_i$ (ind. rational) and $x(N) = v(N)$ (efficient). Then $x_i + \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^n v(\{j\}) \leq v(N)$, hence $x_i \leq v(N) - \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^n v(\{j\})$.
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First, let $\pi_i : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ the projection function s.t. $\pi_i(x_1, \dots, x_m) = x_i$.

Then, let us define the following sets:

$$\begin{cases} A_0 = A \\ A_{i+1} = \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in A_i} \pi_{i+1}(x) \\ i \in \{0, 1, \dots, m-1\} \end{cases}$$

- $A_0 = A$
- $A_1 = \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in A} \pi_1(x)$ is the set of elements in A with the smallest first entry in the sequence.
- $A_2 = \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in A_1} \pi_2(x)$ composed of the elements that have the smallest second entry among the elements with the smallest first entry
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Thm A₂: Extreme value theorem: Let X be a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m , $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ a **continuous** function.

Using the extreme value theorem, $\min_{x \in A_i} \pi_{i+1}(x)$ exists and it is reached in A_i , hence $\operatorname{argmin}_{x \in A_i} \pi_{i+1}(x)$ is non-empty.

Now, we need to show it is compact.

We note by $\pi_i^{-1} : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ the inverse of π_i . Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, $\pi_i^{-1}(\alpha)$ is the set of all vectors $\langle x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, \alpha, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_m \rangle$ s.t. $x_j \in \mathbb{R}$, $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, $j \neq i$. We can rewrite A_{i+1} as:

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Proof of theorem 1

Thm A₃: Let X be a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n .

$f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous iff for every closed subset $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, the set $f^{-1}(B)$ is compact.

$$A_{i+1} = \underbrace{\pi_{i+1}^{-1} \left(\underbrace{\left\{ \min_{x \in A_i} \pi_{i+1}(x) \right\}}_{\text{closed}} \right)}_{\text{closed}} \cap A_i$$

According to Thm A₃, it is a compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m

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 the intersection of two closed sets is closed and in \mathbb{R}^m ,
 and a closed subset of a compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m
 is a compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m ✓

Hence A_{i+1} is a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m and the proof is complete. □

For a TU game (N, v) the nucleolus $Nu(N, v)$ is non-empty when $Imp \neq \emptyset$, which is a great property as agents will always find an agreement. But there is more!

Theorem

The nucleolus has **at most one** element

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To prove this, we need theorems 3 and 4.

Theorem (3)

Let A be a non-empty convex subset of \mathbb{R}^m

Then the set $\{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A \ x \blacktriangleright \leq_{lex} y \blacktriangleright\}$ has at most one element.

Theorem (4)

Let (N, v) be a TU game such that $Imp \neq \emptyset$.

(i) Imp is a non-empty and convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^{|N|}$

(ii) $\{e(x) \mid x \in Imp\}$ is a non-empty convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2|N|}$

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Proof of Theorem 3

Let A be a non-empty convex subset of \mathbb{R}^m , and $M^{in} = \{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A \ x \blacktriangleright \leq_{lex} y \blacktriangleright\}$. We now prove that $|M^{in}| \leq 1$.

Towards a contradiction, let us assume M^{in} has at least two elements x and y , $x \neq y$. By definition of M^{in} , we must have $x \blacktriangleright = y \blacktriangleright$.

Let $\alpha \in (0,1)$ and σ be a permutation of $\{1, \dots, m\}$ such that $(\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y) \blacktriangleright = \sigma(\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y) = \alpha \sigma(x) + (1-\alpha)\sigma(y)$.

Let us show by contradiction that $\sigma(x) = x \blacktriangleright$ and $\sigma(y) = y \blacktriangleright$.

Let us assume that either $\sigma(x) <_{lex} x \blacktriangleright$ or $\sigma(y) <_{lex} y \blacktriangleright$, it follows that $\alpha \sigma(x) + (1-\alpha)\sigma(y) <_{lex} \alpha x \blacktriangleright + (1-\alpha)y \blacktriangleright = x \blacktriangleright$.

Since A is convex, $\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y \in A$. But this is a contradiction because by definition of M^{in} , $\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y \in A$ cannot be strictly smaller than $x \blacktriangleright$, $y \blacktriangleright$ in A . This proves $\sigma(x) = x \blacktriangleright$ and $\sigma(y) = y \blacktriangleright$.

Since $x \blacktriangleright = y \blacktriangleright$, we have $\sigma(x) = \sigma(y)$, hence $x = y$. This contradicts the fact that $x \neq y$. Hence, M^{in} cannot have at least two elements, and $|M^{in}| \leq 1$.

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Proof of Theorem 3

Let A be a non-empty convex subset of \mathbb{R}^m , and $M^{in} = \{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A \ x \blacktriangleright \leq_{lex} y \blacktriangleright\}$. We now prove that $|M^{in}| \leq 1$.

Towards a contradiction, let us assume M^{in} has at least two elements x and y , $x \neq y$. By definition of M^{in} , we must have $x \blacktriangleright = y \blacktriangleright$.

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Let (N, v) be a TU game s.t. $\mathcal{I}mp \neq \emptyset$ (in case $\mathcal{I}mp = \emptyset$, $\mathcal{I}mp$ is trivially convex). Let $(x, y) \in \mathcal{I}mp^2$, $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. Let us prove $\mathcal{I}mp$ is convex by showing that $u = \alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in \mathcal{I}mp$, i.e., individually rational and efficient.

Individual rationality: Since x and y are individually rational, for all agents i ,

$u_i = \alpha x_i + (1 - \alpha)y_i \geq \alpha v(\{i\}) + (1 - \alpha)v(\{i\}) = v(\{i\})$. Hence u is individually rational.

Efficiency: Since x and y are efficient, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i \in N} u_i &= \sum_{i \in N} \alpha x_i + (1 - \alpha)y_i \geq \alpha \sum_{i \in N} x_i + (1 - \alpha) \sum_{i \in N} y_i \\ \sum_{i \in N} u_i &\geq \alpha v(N) + (1 - \alpha)v(N) = v(N), \text{ hence } u \text{ is efficient.} \end{aligned}$$

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Proof Theorem 4 (ii)

Let (N, v) be a TU game and $\mathcal{I}mp$ its set of imputations. We need to show $\{e(z) \mid z \in \mathcal{I}mp\}$ is a non-empty convex subset of \mathbb{R}^m .

Let $(x, y) \in \mathcal{I}mp^2$, $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, and $\mathcal{C} \subseteq N$ and we consider the sequence $\alpha e(x) + (1 - \alpha)e(y)$, and we look at the entry corresponding to coalition \mathcal{C} .

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Since the previous equality is valid for all $\mathcal{C} \subseteq N$, both sequences are equal: $\alpha e(x) + (1 - \alpha)e(y) = e(\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y)$.

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Proof that the nucleolus has at most one element

Let (N, v) be a TU game, and Imp its set of imputations.

Theorem 4(ii): $\{e(x) \mid x \in \text{Imp}\}$ is a non-empty convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^{2^{|N|}}$.

Theorem 3: If A is a non-empty convex subset of \mathbb{R}^m , then the set $\{x \in A \mid \forall y \in A \ x \blacktriangleright \leq_{\text{lex}} y \blacktriangleright\}$ has at most one element.

Applying theorem 3 with $A = \{e(x) \mid x \in \text{Imp}\}$ we obtain $B = \{e(x) \mid x \in \text{Imp} \wedge \forall y \in \text{Imp} \ e(x) \blacktriangleright \leq_{\text{lex}} e(y) \blacktriangleright\}$ has at most one element.

B is the image of the nucleolus under the function e . We need to make sure that an $e(x)$ corresponds to at most one element in Imp . This is true since for $(x, y) \in \text{Imp}^2$, we have $x \neq y \Rightarrow e(x) \neq e(y)$.

Hence $Nu(N, v) = \{x \mid x \in \text{Imp} \wedge \forall y \in \text{Imp} \ e(x) \blacktriangleright \leq_{\text{lex}} e(y) \blacktriangleright\}$ has at most one element!

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Summary

- We defined the excess of a coalition at a payoff distribution, which can model the complaints of the members in a coalition.
- We used the ordered sequence of excesses over all coalitions and the lexicographic ordering to compare any two imputations.
- We defined the nucleolus for a TU game.
 - pros:**
 - If the set of imputations is non-empty, the nucleolus is non-empty.
 - The nucleolus contains at most one element.
 - When the core is non-empty, the nucleolus is contained in the core.
 - cons:** Difficult to compute.

Coming next

- The **kernel**, also a member of the bargaining set family, also based on the excess.