# Cooperative Games Lecture 8: Simple Games


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
ILLC - University of Amsterdam



- Simple games: a class of TU games for modeling voting.
- Measuring the power of a voter: Shapley Shubik, Banzhaff and Co.

# Simple games





One can represent the game by stating all the wining coalitions. Thanks to monotonicity, it is sufficient to only write down the minimal winning coalitions defined as follows:

Definition (Minimal winning coalition)

Let (N, v) be a TU game. A coalition C is a minimal winning coalition iff v(C) = 1 and  $\forall i \in C$ ,  $v(C \setminus \{i\}) = 0$ .

 $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$ 

We use majority voting, and in case of a tie, the decision of player 1 wins.

The set of winning coalitions is  $\{\{1,2\},\{1,3\},\{1,4\},\{1,2,3\},\{1,2,4\},\{1,3,4\},\{2,3,4\},\{1,2,3,4\}\}.$ 

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Formal definition of common terms in voting

# **Definition** (Dictator)

Let (N, v) be a simple game. A player  $i \in N$  is a **dictator** iff  $\{i\}$  is a winning coalition.

Note that with the requirements of simple games, it is possible to have more than one dictator!

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# Definition (Veto Player)

Let (N, v) be a simple game. A player  $i \in N$  is a **veto** player if  $N \setminus \{i\}$  is a losing coalition. Alternatively, i is a **veto** player iff for all winning coalition C,  $i \in C$ .

It also follows that a veto player is member of every minimal winning coalitions. Formal definition of common terms in voting

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It also follows that a veto player is member of every minimal winning coalitions.

Definition (blocking coalition)

A coalition  $C \subseteq N$  is a **blocking coalition** iff C is a losing coalition and  $\forall S \subseteq N \setminus C$ ,  $S \setminus C$  is a losing coalition.

A game  $(N, w_{i \in N}, q)$  is a **weighted voting game** when v satisfies unanimity, monotonicity and the valuation function is defined as

$$v(S) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ when } \sum_{i \in S} w_i \ge q \\ 0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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A weighted voting game is a **succinct** representation, as we only need to define a weight for each agent and a threshold.

Weighted voting game is a strict subclass of voting games. i.e., all voting games are **not** weighted voting games.

Example: Let  $(\{1,2,3,4\},v)$  a voting game such that the set of minimal winning coalitions is  $\{\{1,2\},\{3,4\}\}$ . Let us assume we can represent (N,v) with a weighted voting game  $[q; w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4]$ .

$$v(\{1,2\}) = 1 \text{ then } w_1 + w_2 \ge q$$
  

$$v(\{3,4\}) = 1 \text{ then } w_3 + w_4 \ge q$$
  

$$v(\{1,3\}) = 0 \text{ then } w_1 + w_3 < q$$
  

$$v(\{2,4\}) = 0 \text{ then } w_2 + w_4 < q$$

But then,  $w_1 + w_2 + w_3 + w_4 < 2q$  and  $w_1 + w_2 + w_3 + w_4 \ge 2q$ , which is impossible. Hence, (N, v) cannot be represented by a weighted voting game.

Let us consider the game [q; 4, 2, 1].

- q = 1: minimal winning coalitions:  $\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$
- q = 2: minimal winning coalitions: {1},{2}
- q = 3: minimal winning coalitions: {1},{2,3}
- q = 4: minimal winning coalition: {1}
- q = 5: minimal winning coalitions:  $\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}$
- q = 6: minimal winning coalition: {1,2}

• q = 7: minimal winning coalition: {1,2,3}

for q = 4 ("majority" weight), 1 is a dictator, 2 and 3 are dummies.

# Stability for simple games

#### Theorem

Let (N, v) be a simple game. Then  $Core(N, v) = \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n \middle| \begin{array}{l} x \text{ is an imputation} \\ x_i = 0 \text{ for each non-veto player } i \end{array} \right\}$ 

#### Proof

- $\subseteq$  Let  $x \in Core(N, v)$ . By definition x(N) = 1. Let *i* be a non-veto player.  $x(N \setminus \{i\}) \ge v(N \setminus \{i\}) = 1$ . Hence  $x(N \setminus \{i\}) = 1$  and  $x_i = 0$ .
- ⊇ Let *x* be an imputation and  $x_i = 0$  for every non-veto player *i*. Since x(N) = 1, the set *V* of veto players is non-empty and x(V) = 1.

Let  $\mathcal{C} \subseteq N$ . If  $\mathcal{C}$  is a winning coalition then  $V \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ , hence  $x(\mathcal{C}) \ge v(\mathcal{C})$ . Otherwise,  $v(\mathcal{C})$  is a losing coalition (which may contain veto players), and  $x(\mathcal{C}) \ge v(\mathcal{C})$ . Hence, *x* is group rational.

#### Theorem

A simple game (N, v) is convex iff it is a unanimity game  $(N, v_V)$  where *V* is the set of veto players.

Proof

A game is convex iff  $\forall S, T \subseteq N \ v(S) + v(T) \leq v(S \cap T) + v(S \cup T)$ .

 $\Rightarrow$  Let us assume (N, v) is convex.

If *S* and *T* are winning coalitions,  $S \cup T$  is a winning coalition by monotonicity. Then, we have  $2 \le 1 + v(S \cap T)$  and it follows that  $v(S \cap T) = 1$ . The intersection of two winning coalitions is a winning coalition.

Moreover, from the definition of veto players, the intersection of all winning coalitions is the set *V* of veto players. Hence, v(V) = 1.

By monotonicity, if  $V \subseteq \mathfrak{C}$ ,  $v(\mathfrak{C}) = 1$ 

Otherwise,  $V \nsubseteq \mathbb{C}$ . Then there must be a veto player  $i \notin \mathbb{C}$ , and it must be the case that  $v(\mathbb{C}) = 0$   $\checkmark$ 

Hence, for all coalition  $\mathcal{C} \subseteq N$ ,  $v(\mathcal{C}) = 1$  iff  $V \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ .

# Proof

(continuation)

- ⇐ Let  $(N, v_V)$  a unanimity game. Let us prove it is a convex game. Let  $S \subseteq N$  and  $T \subseteq N$ , and we want to prove that  $v(S) + v(T) \leq v(S \cup T) + v(S \cap T)$ .
  - case  $V \subseteq S \cap T$ : Then  $V \subseteq S$  and  $V \subseteq T$ , and we have  $2 \leq 2 \checkmark$

• case 
$$V \not\subseteq S \cap T \land V \subseteq S \cup T$$
:

- if  $V \subseteq S$  then  $V \nsubseteq T$  and  $1 \leqslant 1$   $\checkmark$
- if  $V \subseteq T$  then  $V \nsubseteq S$  and  $1 \leqslant 1$   $\checkmark$
- otherwise  $V \nsubseteq S$  and  $V \nsubseteq T$ , and then  $0 \leqslant 1$   $\checkmark$
- case  $V \not\subseteq S \cup T$ : then  $0 \leq 0 \checkmark$

For all cases,  $v(S) + v(T) \leq v(S \cup T) + v(S \cap T)$ , hence a unanimity game is convex. In addition, all members of *V* are veto players.

Convex simple games are the games with a single minimal winning coalition.

# **Voting Power**

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It seems that the players have symmetric roles, but it is not reflected in their weights.

Shapley-Shubik power index

# **Definition** (Pivotal or swing player)

Let (N, v) be a simple game. A agent *i* is **pivotal** or **a swing agent** for a coalition  $C \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}$  if agent *i* turns the coalition C from a losing to a winning coalition by joining C, i.e., v(C) = 0 and  $v(C \cup \{i\}) = 1$ .

Given a **permutation**  $\sigma$  on *N*, there is a single pivotal agent.

The Shapley-Shubik index of an agent i is the percentage of permutation in which i is pivotal, i.e.

$$I_{SS}(N,v,i) = \sum_{\mathfrak{C} \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} \frac{|\mathfrak{C}|!(|N| - |\mathcal{C}| - 1)!}{|N|!} (v(\mathfrak{C} \cup \{i\}) - v(\mathfrak{C})).$$


"For each permutation, the pivotal player gets a point."

The Shapley-Shubik power index is the Shapley value. The index corresponds to the expected marginal utility assuming all join orders to form the grand coalitions are equally likely. Let (N, v) be a TU game.

- We want to count the **number of coalitions** in which an agent is **a swing agent**.
- For each coalition, we determine which agent is a swing agent (more than one agent may be pivotal).
- The **raw Banzhaff index** of a player *i* is  $\beta_i = \frac{\sum_{\mathcal{C} \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} v(\mathcal{C} \cup \{i\}) - v(\mathcal{C})}{2^{n-1}}.$
- For a simple game (N, v), v(N) = 1 and  $v(\emptyset) = 0$ , at least one player *i* has a power index  $\beta_i \neq 0$ . Hence,  $B = \sum_{j \in N} \beta_j > 0$ .
- The normalized Banzhaff index of player *i* for a simple game (N, v) is defined as  $I_B(N, v, i) = \frac{\beta_i}{B}$ .

The index corresponds to the expected marginal utility assuming all coalitions are equally likely.

# Examples: [7; 4, 3, 2, 1]



The power indices may behave in an unexpected way if we modify the game.

### Paradox of new players

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Consider the game [4;2,2,1]

- Player 3 is dummy, should have an index of 0.
- Assume a new player joins with weight 1.
- Player 3 is no longer a dummy, her index has increased and is strictly positive in the new game.

# intuition: If a voter splits her identities and share her weights between the new identities, she should not gain or lose power.

increase of power

*n*-player game [n+1;2,1,...,1]: all voters have a Shapley value of  $\frac{1}{n}$ .

Voter 1 splits into two voters with weight of 1.

In the new game, each agent has a Shapley value of  $\frac{1}{n+1}$   $\Rightarrow$  voter 1 gets more power.

decrease of power

*n*-player game [2n-1;2,...,2]: all voters have the same Shapley value of  $\frac{1}{n}$ .

Voter 1 splits into two voters with a weight of 1. These new voters have a Shapley value of  $\frac{1}{n(n+1)}$  in the new

game  $\Rightarrow$ voter 1 loses power by a factor of  $\frac{n+1}{2}$ .

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# Other indices

- Coleman indices: all winning coalitions are equally likely. Let W(N, v) be the set of all winning coalitions.
- The power of **collectivity to act**: *P*<sub>*act*</sub> is the probability that a winning vote arise.

$$P_{act} = \frac{|\mathcal{W}(N, v)|}{2^n}$$

• The power **to prevent** an action: *P*<sub>prevent</sub> captures the power of *i* to prevent a coalition to win by withholding its vote.

$$P_{prevent} = \frac{\sum_{\mathcal{C} \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} v(\mathcal{C} \cup \{i\}) - v(\mathcal{C})}{|\mathcal{W}(N, v)|}$$

• The power **to** initiate an action: *P*<sub>init</sub> captures the power of *i* to join a losing coalition so that it becomes a winning one.

$$P_{init} = \frac{\sum_{\mathcal{C} \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} v(\mathcal{C} \cup \{i\}) - v(\mathcal{C})}{2^n - |\mathcal{W}(N, v)|}.$$

- Maybe only minimal winning coalitions are important to measure the power of an agent (non-minimal winning coalitions may form, but only the minimal ones are important to measure power).
- Let (N, v) be a simple game,  $i \in N$  be an agent.  $\mathcal{M}(N, v)$  denotes the set of minimal winning coalitions,  $\mathcal{M}_i(N, v)$  denotes the set of minimal winning coalitions containing *i*.
- The **Deegan-Packel** power index of player *i* is:

$$I_{DP}(N,v,i) = rac{1}{|\mathcal{M}(N,v)|} \sum_{\mathcal{C}\in\mathcal{M}_i(N,v)} rac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|}.$$

• The **public good index** of player *i* is defined as

$$I_{PG}(N,v,i) = rac{|\mathfrak{M}_i(N,v)|}{\sum_{j\in N}|\mathfrak{M}_j(N,v)|}.$$

[4; 3, 2, 1, 1]						[5; 3,2,1,1]					
ν	$V = \begin{cases} \\ \\ \end{cases}$	{ <b>1</b> ,	{1,2},{1, 2,3},{1,2 { <mark>2,3,4</mark> },{1	,4},{ <mark>1</mark> ,3,	$4\}, \ $	$\mathbb{V} = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \{1,2\},\{1,2,3\},\{1,2,4\},\\ \{1,3,4\},\{1,2,3,4\}\} \end{array} \right\}$					}
$\mathcal{M} = \{\{1,2\},\{1,3\},\{1,4\},\{2,3,4\}\} \qquad \mathcal{M} = \{\{1,2\},\{1,3,4\}\}$											
		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4	
	β	68	28	28	2 8	β	58	38	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{8}$	
	$I_B$	$\frac{6}{12}$	$\frac{2}{12}$	$\frac{2}{12}$	$\frac{2}{12}$	IB	$\frac{5}{10}$	$\frac{3}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	
	Pact	$\frac{8}{16} = \frac{1}{2}$				Pact	$\frac{5}{16}$				
	P <sub>prevent</sub>	618	<u>2</u> 8	28	2 <u>8</u>	P <sub>prevent</sub>	55	315	15	$\frac{1}{5}$	
	Pinit	<u>6</u> 8	2 8	2 8	2 8	Pinit	$\frac{5}{11}$	$\frac{3}{11}$	$\frac{1}{11}$	$\frac{1}{11}$	
	$I_{DP}$	$\frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{3}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3}\right)$	$\frac{1}{4} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3}\right)$	$\frac{1}{4} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3}\right)$	I <sub>DP</sub>	$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3}\right)$	$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{3}$	
	$I_{PG}$	39	<u>2</u> 9	<u>2</u> 9	<u>2</u> 9	I <sub>PG</sub>	<u>2</u> 5	$\frac{1}{5}$	1 5	$\frac{1}{5}$	

# Summary

- We introduced the simple games
- We considered few examples
- We studied some power indices

- Representation and Complexitity issues
- Are there some succinct representations for some classes of games.
- How hard is it to compute a solution concept?