

# ***Collusive behaviour of self-interested agents in an argumentation framework***

**Proposition of Stefano Moretti ([stefano.moretti@dauphine.fr](mailto:stefano.moretti@dauphine.fr)) and Gabriella Pigozzi ([gabriella.pigozzi@dauphine.fr](mailto:gabriella.pigozzi@dauphine.fr))**

Various semantics have been developed to characterise the acceptability of individual arguments in a given argumentation framework. However, little work exists on understanding the strategic aspects of abstract argumentation among self-interested agents, and in particular the problem of understanding whether agents have incentive to lie by hiding arguments in an attempt to influence the outcome (see in particular the approach proposed by Rahwan and Larson (2008)).

The internship will focus on strategic interaction in argumentation systems, and in particular will be addressed to study the possibility of a collusive behaviour among self-interested agents under different debate protocols.

## **References:**

Rahwan, I., & Larson, K. (2008) Mechanism design for abstract argumentation. In *Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems-Volume 2* (pp. 1031-1038). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.  
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