The objective of this research project is the study of different collective decision-making mechanisms and strategic interaction situations. Our work includes the development of normative models (via, in particular, the axiomatic characterization of voting rules, interaction situations, solution concepts, etc.) and the study of these models from the point of view of their algorithmic difficulty and their calculation.
The research carried out is grouped around two axes:
1) computational social choice: study of collective decision (in particular voting and equitable sharing of resources) from the point of view of the axiomatic characterization of decision mechanisms, and the impact, on their feasibility, of their algorithmic complexity, their information needs, and their vulnerability to strategic behavior.
2) algorithmic games: efficient calculation of solutions for games and study of the complexity of these problems, combinatorial optimization problems on game structures, compact representation of games, learning algorithms in dynamic games.
Keywords : algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, voting theory, axiomatic approach, strategic behavior.