Rank-based fairness in one-to-one matchings - Anaëlle Wilcszynski MICS CentraleSupelec

13h45 - 15h15 salle B110

Abstract: Our work deals with one-to-one matchings where each agent must be assigned to exactly one element and agents have strict ordinal preferences over the elements to be matched with. We explore fair matchings by relaxing envy-freeness to account for justified envy based on the rank in the agents’ preferences. A rank-envy-free matching prevents that an agent prefers the match of another agent whereas she has ranked it better. We show that, while we can always efficiently construct a rank-envy-free matching in house allocation, i.e., when matching agents with objects, it is way more demanding in marriage or roommate settings, i.e., when matching agents with other agents. We study parameterizations of rank-envy-freeness, as well as natural relaxations of this concept. We also investigate the connections between this family of rank-based fairness criteria and known optimality or stability concepts.