Curriculum vitae

Nunez Matias

Chargé de recherche CNRS
LAMSADE

matias.nunezping@lamsade.dauphinepong.fr
Tel : 0144054551

Dernières publications

Articles

Nunez M., Xefteris D. (2017), Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 119, n°2, p. 346-374

Laslier J-F., Nunez M., Pimienta C. (2017), Reaching consensus through approval bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 104, p. 241-251

Nunez M., Sanver M. (2017), Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity, Mathematical Social Sciences, n°special issue

Nunez M., Xefteris D. (2017), Implementation Via Approval Mechanisms, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 170, p. 169-181

Courtin S., Nunez M. (2017), Dominance solvable approval voting games, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 19, n°6, p. 1055-1076

Nunez M., Scarsini M. (2016), Competing over a finite number of locations, Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 4, n°2, p. 125-136

Nunez M., Laslier J-F. (2016), Pivots et Elections, L'Actualité économique

Nunez M., Valletta G. (2015), The Informational Basis of Scoring Rules, Review of Economic Design, vol. 19, n°4, p. 279-297

Nunez M., Laslier J-F. (2015), Bargaining through Approval, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 60, p. 63-73

Nunez M. (2015), Threshold Voting leads to Type-Revelation, Economics Letters, vol. 136, p. 211-213

Nunez M. (2014), The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting, Economic Theory, vol. 56, n°1, p. 157-189

Nunez M. (2010), Condorcet consistency of approval voting: a counter example in large Poisson games, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 22, n°1, p. 64-84

Chapitres d'ouvrage

Nunez M., Scarsini M. (2017), Large Spatial Competition, in Lina Mallozzi, Egidio D'Amato, Panos M Pardalos, Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory Springer, p. 225-246

Nunez M. (2014), Social Choice Theory, in Michael T. Gibbons, Diana Coole, Elisabeth Ellis, Kennan Ferguson, The Encyclopedia of Political Thought Wiley, p. 3485-3490

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