

Preference Modelling

A brief introduction

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Motivation

Introduction

Lemma

- if you have no preference. . .
- then there is no need to worry about decisions!

Aims

- present the standard model of preference modelling
 - analyze a few classical questions within the standard model
- introduce some extensions of the standard model

Preference Modelling

Variety of disciplines

- Economics
 - consumer theory
- Psychology
 - experiments
- Political Science
 - voters
- Marketing
 - consumers
- Operations Research
 - objective function
- Multiple Criteria Decision Making
 - criteria

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Preference Modelling

Variety of perspectives

- Normative
 - link between preference models and “rational behavior”
- Descriptive
 - preference models as compatible with experimental results
- Prescriptive
 - help someone structure a preference model

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Preference Modelling

Variety of objects to compare

- vectors in \mathbb{R}^k
 - Operations Research: Linear Programming (LP)
 - Economics: consumer theory
- finite list defined implicitly
 - Operations Research: combinatorial optimization
- finite list defined explicitly
 - candidates in an election
 - investment projects

Consequence

- **huge** literature
- aim: brief introduction
 - vocabulary
 - main structures
 - main questions

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Remarks

Position in the decision process

- a set of objects has been identified: X
- one and only one element of X will be finally implemented

Ignored

- experiments
 - framing & presentation effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981)
- sophisticated recent models
 - reference points (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)

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Standard model

How to compare the objects in X ?

- simple procedure
 - build a mapping $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - compare objects using f

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y)$$

Interpretation

- f “measures” the desirability of the objects
- \succsim is a **binary relation** on the set X
 - \succsim reads “at least as good as”

Hypotheses

- 1 f is “known” with **precision**
- 2 f is given for **all** objects
- 3 there is only **one** f

Remark

- model ignores “cardinal properties” of f

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Examples

Example 1: grading students

- X is a set of students
- f is the grade (0–20 scale) obtained at a written exam

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y)$$

Example 2: choosing investment projects

- X is a set of projects
- f gives the NPV (€) of the projects

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y)$$

Example 3: Linear Programming

- X is a convex polytope in \mathbb{R}^k , $\mathbf{x} \in X$
- $f(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^k c_i x_i$: value of the objective function

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y)$$

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Quick reminder

Binary relation

- a binary relation T on a set A is a subset of $A \times A$
- we write $a T b$ instead of $(a, b) \in T$

Operations on binary relations

- binary relations are **sets**
- we may use standard set operations on them: $T \cap R$, $T \cup R$, $T \subseteq R$
- product of two binary relation T and R on A
 - $a T \cdot R b \Leftrightarrow [a T c \text{ and } c R b, \text{ for some } c \in A]$

Quick reminder

Properties of binary relation

A binary relation T on a set A is:

- **reflexive** if $a T a$
- **irreflexive** if $\text{Not}[a T a]$
- **symmetric** if $a T b \Rightarrow b T a$
- **antisymmetric** if $a T b \text{ and } b T a \Rightarrow a = b$
- **asymmetric** if $a T b \Rightarrow \text{Not}[b T a]$
- **weakly complete** if $a \neq b \Rightarrow a T b \text{ or } b T a$
- **complete** if $a T b \text{ or } b T a$
- **transitive** if $a T b \text{ and } b T c \Rightarrow a T c$
- **negatively transitive** if $\text{Not}[a T b] \text{ and } \text{Not}[b T c] \Rightarrow \text{Not}[a T c]$

for all $a, b, c \in A$

- there are many **links** between these properties

Quick reminder

Links

- transitivity $T^2 \subseteq T$
- asymmetry \Rightarrow irreflexivity
- complete \Leftrightarrow reflexive and weakly complete
- [asymmetry and negatively transitivity] \Rightarrow transitivity
- [completeness and transitivity] \Rightarrow negatively transitivity

Symmetric and asymmetric parts

- asymmetric part of T : $x T^\alpha y \Leftrightarrow [x T y \text{ and } \text{Not}[y T x]]$
- symmetric part of T : $x T^\sigma y \Leftrightarrow [x T y \text{ and } y T x]$

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Representation of a binary relation

Matrix representation

Let $A = \{a, b, c, d, e\}$. Consider the binary relation $\succsim = \{(a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (d, b), (d, d)\}$.

\circlearrowleft	a	b	c	d	e
a	0	1	0	0	0
b	1	0	1	0	0
c	0	0	0	0	0
d	0	1	0	1	0
e	0	0	0	0	0

$$M_{ab}^T = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a T b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


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Representation of a binary relation

Graph representation

Let $A = \{a, b, c, d, e\}$. Consider the binary relation $\succsim = \{(a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (d, b), (d, d)\}$.



Graph

- elements of X are **vertices**
- elements related by T define **arcs**

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Standard model

Model

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y)$$

Two obvious properties of \succsim

- \succsim is **complete** $x \succsim y$ or $y \succsim x$, for all $x, y \in X$
- \succsim is **transitive** $[x \succsim y \text{ and } y \succsim z] \Rightarrow x \succsim z$, for all $x, y, z \in X$

Definition

A complete and transitive relation is called a **weak order** (complete preorder, total preorder)

Remarks

- if f is injective, \succsim becomes **antisymmetric**
- a complete, antisymmetric and transitive relation is a **total order**

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Strict preference and Indifference

Asymmetric part of \succsim

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow [x \succsim y \text{ and } \text{Not}[y \succsim x]] \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y)$$

- \succ is interpreted as **strict preference**
- \succ is asymmetric, transitive, negatively transitive
 - $[\text{Not}[x \succ y] \text{ and } \text{Not}[y \succ z]] \Rightarrow \text{Not}[x \succ z]$, for all $x, y, z \in X$

Symmetric part of \succsim

$$x \sim y \Leftrightarrow [x \succsim y \text{ and } y \succsim x] \Leftrightarrow f(x) = f(y)$$

- \sim is interpreted as **indifference**
- \sim is reflexive, symmetric, transitive
- \sim is an **equivalence**

Notation

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow y \precsim x$$

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow y \prec x$$

Properties

Completeness of \succsim implies that:

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \text{Not}[y \succ x]$$

Strict preference and Indifference

Summary

- with a weak order \succsim we have equivalence classes of \sim that are totally ordered by \succ

Remarks

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow [x \succsim y \text{ and } \text{Not}[y \succsim x]]$$

$$x \sim y \Leftrightarrow [x \succsim y \text{ and } y \succsim x]$$

- \succ and \sim are **exhaustive**: for all $x, y \in X$ we at least one among
 - $x \sim y, x \succ y, y \succ x$
- \succ and \sim are **exclusive**: for all $x, y \in X$ we at most one among
 - $x \sim y, x \succ y, y \succ x$
- there are no **incomparable** objects

Summary

	$y \succsim x$	$\text{Not}[y \succsim x]$
$x \succsim y$	$x \sim y$	$x \succ y$
$\text{Not}[x \succsim y]$	$y \succ x$	\emptyset

Alternative presentation

- question: “is x at least as good as y ?”
- two exclusive answers
 - YES: $x \succsim y$
 - NO: $\text{Not}[x \succsim y]$
- these answers are such that \succsim is complete and transitive

Some obvious properties

$$[x \succ y \text{ and } y \sim z] \Rightarrow x \succ z$$

$$[x \sim y \text{ and } y \succ z] \Rightarrow x \succ z$$

$$\succ \cdot \sim \cup \succ$$

$$\sim \cdot \succ \cup \succ$$

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Example

$$X = \{x, y, z, w, t\}$$

$$x \sim x, y \sim y, z \sim z, w \sim w, t \sim t$$

$$x \succ y, x \succ z, x \succ w, x \succ t$$

$$y \succ x, y \succ z, y \succ w, y \succ t$$

$$z \succ w, z \succ t$$

$$w \succ t$$

$$t \succ w$$

\sim	x	y	z	w	t
x	1	1	1	1	1
y	1	1	1	1	1
z	0	0	1	1	1
w	0	0	0	1	1
t	0	0	0	1	1

rows and columns have been ordered according to **degrees**

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Example

\sim	x	y	z	w	t
x	1	1	1	1	1
y	1	1	1	1	1
z	0	0	1	1	1
w	0	0	0	1	1
t	0	0	0	1	1


\succsim	x	y	z	w	t		
x	1	1	1	1	1	5	3
y	1	1	1	1	1	5	3
z	0	0	1	1	1	3	0
w	0	0	0	1	1	2	-3
t	0	0	0	1	1	2	-3
	2	2	3	3	5		

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Example

$$\begin{aligned}
 X &= \{x, y, z, w, t\} \\
 x &\succsim x, y \succsim y, z \succsim z, w \succsim w, t \succsim t \\
 x &\succsim y, x \succsim z, x \succsim w, x \succsim t \\
 y &\succsim x, y \succsim z, y \succsim w, y \succsim t \\
 z &\succsim w, z \succsim t \\
 w &\succsim t \\
 t &\succsim w
 \end{aligned}$$



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Numerical representation

Problem

Let \succsim be a weak order on X

Can we always build a numerical representation of \succsim ?

Question

Given a weak order \succsim on X is there a mapping $v : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that, for all $x, y \in X$,

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow v(x) \geq v(y)$$

Obvious answer: NO (thanks Georg!)

- any total order on $2^{\mathbb{R}}$ cannot have a numerical representation
- there is no injection from $2^{\mathbb{R}}$ to \mathbb{R}

Quick reminder on sets

Finite sets

The set X is **finite** if there $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that there is a bijection between X and $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Countably infinite sets

The set X is **countably infinite** if there is a bijection between X and \mathbb{N} or, equivalently, $\mathbb{N}_+ = \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$

Denumerable sets

- the set X is **denumerable** if it is finite or countably infinite
- the union or the Cartesian product of two denumerable sets is denumerable
- \mathbb{Z} and \mathbb{Q} are denumerable

Quick reminder on sets

Cardinality

- the set X have a larger cardinality at least as large as Y is there a mapping of X **onto** Y
- this defines a complete and transitive relation

Infinite sets

- the set \mathbb{R} have a larger cardinality than the set \mathbb{Q}
- the converse is **false**
- \mathbb{R}^n and \mathbb{R} have the same cardinality
- 2^X has a cardinality that is **strictly larger** than that of X

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Results

Theorem (Cantor, 1895)

Let X be a denumerable set (i.e., finite or countably infinite). Let \succsim be a binary relation on X .

There is a real valued function v on X such that

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow v(x) \geq v(y)$$

for all $x, y \in X$

if and only if

\succsim is a weak order

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Proof

Proof.

Necessity is clear.

Let us show sufficiency. Since X is denumerable, we can number its elements in such a way that $X = \{x_i : i \in K \subseteq \mathbb{N}_+\}$.

To each $y \in X$ define $N(y) = \{i \in K : y \succ x_i\}$.

Define u letting $u(y) = \sum_{i \in N(y)} 1/2^i$. This series obviously converges.

If $x \succ y$ we have, using transitivity, $N(x) \supseteq N(y)$ so that $u(x) \geq u(y)$.

Conversely suppose that $u(x) \geq u(y)$ and $\text{Not}[x \succ y]$. We have $y \succ x$, using completeness, and $\text{Not}[x \succ y]$. Hence $N(y) \supsetneq N(x)$, so that $u(y) > u(x)$, a contradiction. \square

General case

Remark

There are weak orders on sets having at most the cardinality of \mathbb{R} that **do not** have a numerical representation

Lexicographic preferences

Let $X = \mathbb{R} \times \{1, 0\}$. Define \succ letting

$$(x, \alpha) \succ (y, \beta) \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} x > y \text{ or} \\ x = y \text{ and } \alpha \geq \beta \end{cases}$$

It is clear that \succ is a weak order.

Suppose that there is a numerical representation of \succ . Take any $x > y$. We have $(x, 1) \succ (x, 0) \succ (y, 1) \succ (y, 0)$ so that $v(x, 1) > v(x, 0) > v(y, 1) > v(y, 0)$. But there is a rational number $\rho(x)$ in the interval $(v(x, 0), v(x, 1))$ and there is a there is a rational number $\rho(y)$ in the interval $(v(y, 0), v(y, 1))$. We have $x > y \Rightarrow \rho(x) > \rho(y)$. Hence ρ is an injection from \mathbb{R} to \mathbb{Q} , which is impossible.

General case

\mathbb{Q} is dense in \mathbb{R}

Let $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$. If $x > y$ then there is $z \in \mathbb{Q}$ such that $x > z > y$.

Denseness

Let \succsim be a weak order on X . The set $Y \subseteq X$ is **dense** in X for \succsim if, for all $x, y \in X$ such that $x \succ y$, we have $x \succsim z \succsim y$, for some $z \in Y$.

Hint

- with this definition \mathbb{N} is dense in itself for \geq

Theorem (Debreu, 1954)

Let \succsim be a binary relation on X . There is a numerical representation of \succsim **if and only if** \succsim is a weak order and there is a denumerable set $Y \subseteq X$ that is dense in X for \succsim .

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Uniqueness

Uniqueness

Suppose that \succsim on X has a numerical representation v . This numerical representation is not unique. Indeed, it is easy to see that $\Phi \circ v$ is also a numerical representation as soon as Φ is strictly increasing. It is easy to see that these are the only possible transformations that can be applied to v . Hence v is an **ordinal scale**.

Scales

- **ordinal scale**: unique up to a strictly increasing transformation $u = \Phi \circ v$
- **interval scale**: unique up to a positive affine transformation $u = \alpha v + \beta$ with $\alpha > 0$
- **ratio scale**: unique up to a positive linear transformation $u = \alpha v$ with $\alpha > 0$

Question

- how could we obtain an interval or a ratio scale?

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Ordinal scales

Example

	v_1	v_2	v_3	v_4
x	0	0	0	1
y	3	9	27	3
z	4	16	64	3.5
w	5	25	125	1000

- the functions v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4 are **all** numerical representations of the weak order $w \succ z \succ y \succ x$
- assertion: the average desirability of x and w is larger than the average desirability of y and z
- we have $(v_1(w) + v_1(x))/2 < (v_1(z) + v_1(y))/2$
- but $(v_2(w) + v_2(x))/2 > (v_2(z) + v_2(y))/2$
- this is an example of a **meaningless** statement

Meaningfulness

Meaningful and meaningless statements

- I weigh twice as much as you
 - meaningful (but may be false!)
- Average temperature are twice higher in Paris than in Moscow
 - meaningless (unless you use the Kelvin scale!)
- the difference in average temperature between Paris and Moscow is twice the difference in average temperature between Rome and London
 - meaningful (but may be false!)

How do I observe \succsim ?

Observability

- I cannot simply ask for \succsim for epistemological reasons
- I cannot simply ask for the performance measure that is used

Samuelson (1938)

Solution: choice functions

Let $P(X)$ be the set of all nonempty subsets of X . A choice function C is a function from $P(X)$ to $P(X)$ such that $C(A) \subseteq A$, for all $A \in P(X)$.

The set $C(A)$ contains the objects that are judged “choosable” in A .

Remarks

- a choice function can be observed
- is it possible to infer preference from choices?

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Revealed preferences

Rationalizable choice function

A choice function C is **rationalizable** if there is a binary relation \succsim such that, for all $A \in P(X)$,

$$C(A) = M(A, \succ) = \{b \in A : \text{Not}[a \succ b] \text{ for all } a \in A\}$$

- when A is finite, it is clear that if \succsim is a weak order on X , $M(A, \succ)$ is nonempty for all $A \in P(X)$
- the same is true as soon as \succ has no circuit

Not all choice functions can be rationalized

Let $X = \{a, b, c\}$. Suppose that

$$C(\{a, b\}) = \{a\}$$

$$C(\{b, c\}) = \{b\}$$

$$C(\{a, c\}) = \{c\}$$

Then we must have $a \succ b$, $b \succ c$ and $c \succ a$. This implies that $M(X, \succ)$ is empty. Hence C cannot be rationalized.

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Revealed preferences

Condition α

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} x \in B \subseteq A \\ x \in C(A) \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow x \in C(B)$$

If the World champion is Italian, she must be the champion of Italy

Condition β

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} B \subseteq A \\ x, y \in C(B) \\ y \in C(A) \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow x \in C(A)$$

If there are two Italian champions (tied) and one of them is a World champion, the other must also be a World champion

Revealed preferences: results

Theorem (Sen, 1970)

Let C be a choice function on a finite set X . It can be rationalized by a weak order **if and only if** it satisfies conditions α and β .

Numerous extensions

- C is not observed for all elements of $P(X)$
- X is not finite
- rationalization by an acyclic relation \succ

Revealed preferences: questions

Condition α

- if I have to choose in {Steak, Sole Meunière}
 - I choose Steak
- if I have to choose in {Steak, Sole Meunière, Frog Legs}
 - I choose Sole Meunière
- epistemic value of the menu
- violates condition α

Condition β

- if I have to choose in {Bike, Horse}
 - I am indifferent and both are choosable
- if I have to choose in {Bike, Bike with bell, Horse}
 - I am indifferent between Bike with bell and Horse (both are choosable)
- violates condition β

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Aggregation

Question

- let $\succsim_1, \succsim_2, \dots, \succsim_k$ be weak orders on X
- do “reasonable” aggregation methods of these k weak orders always lead to a weak order?

Answer

- No!!!! (thanks Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas!)

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Aggregation

- $X = \{x, y, z\}$ is a set of candidates
- three voters express preferences on X as weak orders
- social preference is an aggregation of individual preferences:


$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow |\{i \in N : x \succsim_i y\}| \geq |\{i \in N : y \succsim_i x\}|$$

$$1 : x \succ_1 y \succ_1 z$$

$$2 : z \succ_2 x \succ_2 y$$

$$3 : y \succ_3 z \succ_3 x$$

Condorcet's paradox, 1785



Special structures for X

Structure of X

- left unspecified until now
- when X has a special structure it may be possible to take advantage of this extra structure

Examples of special structures

- decision under risk
 - X is a set of probability distribution on a set of consequences C
- decision under uncertainty
 - X has a homogeneous Cartesian product structure: Y^n if there are n states of nature
- multiple criteria decision making
 - X has a Cartesian product structure: $X_1 \times X_2 \times \dots \times X_n$

Special structures for X

Independence properties

- independence wrt probabilistic mixtures: expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947)

$$f(x) = \sum_{\gamma \in C} p_x(\gamma) u(\gamma)$$

- sure thing principle: subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954)

$$f(x) = \sum_{e \in E} p(e) u(x(\gamma))$$

- independence: additive value functions (Debreu, 1960, Luce & Tukey 1964)

$$f(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_i)$$

More than one performance measure

How to compare the objects in X ?

- simple procedure
 - build several mappings f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} f_1(x) \geq f_1(y) \\ f_2(x) \geq f_2(y) \\ \dots \\ f_n(x) \geq f_n(y) \end{cases}$$

- **dominance** (“Pareto front” and the like)

Alternative: lexicographic aggregation

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} f_1(x) > f_1(y) \\ f_1(x) = f_1(y) \text{ and } f_2(x) > f_2(y) \\ \dots \\ f_1(x) = f_1(y), \dots, f_{n-1}(x) = f_{n-1}(y) \text{ and } f_n(x) > f_n(y) \end{cases}$$

Quasi orders

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} f_1(x) \geq f_1(y) \\ f_2(x) \geq f_2(y) \\ \vdots \\ f_n(x) \geq f_n(y) \end{cases}$$

Two obvious properties of \succsim

- \succsim is **reflexive** ($x \succsim x$, for all $x \in X$)
- \succsim is **transitive** ($[x \succsim y \text{ and } y \succsim z] \Rightarrow x \succsim z$, for all $x, y, z \in X$)

Quasi order

- a reflexive and transitive relation is called a **quasi order**
- if \succsim is antisymmetric it is a **partial order**

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Quasi orders

Any partial order on a set X can be obtained as the intersection of a number of total orders. When X is finite, it only takes a finite number of total orders to obtain a partial order (**dimension** of a partial order, Dushnik & Miller, 1941). The same is true for quasi orders and weak orders.

Theorem (Folk)


Any quasi order on a finite set has a numerical representation such that

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} u_1(x) \geq u_1(y) \\ u_2(x) \geq u_2(y) \\ \dots \\ u_k(x) \geq u_k(y) \end{cases}$$

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Example: partial order of dimension 3




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Example

Let $X = \{x, y, z, w, t\}$.



Remark

- \succ is asymmetric and transitive
- $M(A, \succ)$ is always nonempty when $A \neq \emptyset$ and is finite
- **non-dominated solutions** in MCDM

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Standard model with caution

How to compare the objects in X ?

- simple procedure
 - build a mapping $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - compare objects using f with caution

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + q$$

$$x \sim y \Leftrightarrow |f(x) - f(y)| \geq q$$

$q \geq 0$: constant threshold

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y) - q$$

Remark

- if $q = 0$ are back to the standard model

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Standard model with caution

Model

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y) - q$$

$q \geq 0$: constant threshold

Obvious properties of \succsim

- \succsim is **complete** $x \succsim y$ or $y \succsim x$, for all $x, y \in X$
- \succsim is **not transitive** but \succ is **transitive**

$$\begin{array}{c} \succ \cdot \sim \cup \succ \\ \sim \cdot \succ \cup \succ \end{array}$$

Both these relations are **false**

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$$\begin{array}{c}
 \begin{array}{cc}
 f(x) & f(x) + q \\
 \lceil x \rceil & \lceil y \rceil
 \end{array} & \begin{array}{cc}
 \lceil w \rceil & \\
 \lceil z \rceil & \lceil t \rceil
 \end{array} \\
 \hline
 & \longrightarrow f
 \end{array}$$

$y \succ x$ (the y interval does not intersect and is to the right of the x interval)
 $z \sim w$ (the z interval intersect the w interval)

$z \sim w$ and $w \sim t$ but $t \succ z$
 $t \succ z$ and $z \sim w$ but $t \sim w$
 $w \sim t$ and $t \succ z$ but $w \sim t$

Ferrers

Model

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y) - q$$

Ferrers

$$\left. \begin{array}{l}
 x \succsim y \\
 \text{and} \\
 z \succsim w
 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 x \succsim w \\
 \text{or} \\
 z \succsim y
 \end{array} \right.$$

Necessity

$$\begin{aligned}
 x \succsim y &\Rightarrow f(x) \geq f(y) - q \\
 z \succsim w &\Rightarrow f(z) \geq f(w) - q \\
 \text{Not}[x \succsim w] &\Rightarrow f(x) < f(w) - q \\
 \text{Not}[z \succsim y] &\Rightarrow f(z) < f(y) - q
 \end{aligned}$$

we obtain $f(y) > f(w)$ and $f(w) > f(y)$, a contradiction

Semi-transitivity

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) \geq f(y) - q$$

Semi-transitivity

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} x \succsim y \\ \text{and} \\ y \succsim z \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} x \succsim w \\ \text{or} \\ w \succsim z \end{array} \right.$$

Necessity

$$x \succsim y \Rightarrow f(x) \geq f(y) - q$$

$$y \succsim z \Rightarrow f(y) \geq f(z) - q$$

$$\text{Not}[x \succsim w] \Rightarrow f(x) < f(w) - q$$

$$\text{Not}[w \succsim z] \Rightarrow f(w) < f(z) - q$$

we obtain $f(y) > f(w)$ and $f(w) > f(y)$, a contradiction

Semiorder

Definition

A semiorder is a complete, Ferrers and semi-transitive binary relation

Theorem (Luce, 1956)

A binary relation on a finite set X is a semiorder **if and only if** there is a real valued function u on X and a threshold $q \geq 0$ such that:

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow u(x) \geq u(y) - q$$

Remarks

- not true if X is denumerable
- can be extended to countable set with a variable but consistent threshold


Example

	<i>b</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>
<i>b</i>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>g</i>	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>a</i>	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>c</i>	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>f</i>	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>e</i>	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
<i>d</i>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

	<i>b</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>
<i>b</i>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>g</i>	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>a</i>	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>c</i>	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>f</i>	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>e</i>	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
<i>d</i>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Example

	<i>b</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>
<i>b</i>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>g</i>	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>a</i>	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>c</i>	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>f</i>	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>e</i>	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
<i>d</i>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1



Traces

If \succsim is a semiorder, the relation \succsim^+ defined by

$$x \succsim^+ y \Leftrightarrow [y \succsim z \Rightarrow x \succsim z]$$

is a weak order (note that it is always reflexive and transitive)

If \succsim is a semiorder, the relation \succsim^- defined by

$$x \succsim^- y \Leftrightarrow [z \succsim x \Rightarrow z \succsim y]$$

is a weak order (note that it is always reflexive and transitive)

If \succsim is a semiorder, the relation \succsim^\pm defined by

$$x \succsim^\pm y \Leftrightarrow [x \succsim^+ y \text{ and } x \succsim^- y]$$

is a weak order (note that it is always reflexive and transitive)

- the relation \succsim^\pm is the weak order underlying the semiorder \succsim
- the matrix representation of a semiorder is stepped when rows and columns are arranged wrt \succsim^\pm

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Uniqueness

Two representations of a semiorder

$$x \succ y, x \succ z, y \sim z$$

	v_1	v_2
x	2	2
y	0	0.5
z	0	0

- **irregular** representation

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Standard model with (even more) caution

How to compare the objects in X ?

- simple procedure
 - build a mapping $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - compare objects using f with (even more) caution


$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + q(y)$$

$$x \sim y \Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f(x) \leq f(y) + q(y) \\ f(y) \leq f(x) + q(x) \end{array} \right\}$$

$q(\cdot) \geq 0$: variable threshold

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x) \geq f(y)$$

Example



$y \succ x$ (the y interval does not intersect and is to the right of the x interval)
 $z \sim w$ (the z interval intersect the w interval)
 t is indifferent to all other alternatives

Standard model with (even more) caution

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x) \geq f(y)$$

$q(\cdot) \geq 0$: variable threshold

Obvious properties of \succsim

- \succsim is **complete** $x \succsim y$ or $y \succsim x$, for all $x, y \in X$
- \succsim is **not transitive** but \succ is **transitive**

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Ferrers

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x) \geq f(y)$$

Ferrers

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} x \succsim y \\ \text{and} \\ z \succsim w \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} x \succsim w \\ \text{or} \\ z \succsim y \end{array} \right.$$

Necessity

$$x \succsim y \Rightarrow f(x) + q(x) \geq f(y)$$

$$z \succsim w \Rightarrow f(z) + q(z) \geq f(w)$$

$$\text{Not}[x \succsim w] \Rightarrow f(x) + q(x) < f(w)$$

$$\text{Not}[z \succsim y] \Rightarrow f(z) + q(z) < f(y)$$

we obtain $f(x) + q(x) > f(z) + q(z)$ and $f(z) + q(z) > f(x) + q(x)$, a contradiction.

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Interval order

Definition

An interval order is a complete and Ferrers binary relation

Theorem (Fishburn, 1970)

A binary relation on a finite set X is an interval order **if and only if** there is a real valued function u on X and a nonnegative threshold function q such that:


$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow u(x) + q(x) \geq u(y)$$

Remarks

- remains true if X is denumerable
- add order denseness condition in the general case

Example

	a	b	c	d
a	1	1	1	1
b	0	1	1	1
c	0	0	1	1
d	1	1	1	1



Semi-transitivity can be violated

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} c \succsim d \\ \text{and} \\ d \succsim a \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Not}[c \succsim b] \\ \text{and} \\ \text{Not}[b \succsim a] \end{array} \right.$$

Example

	a	b	c	d
a	1	1	1	1
b	0	1	1	1
c	0	0	1	1
d	1	1	1	1

	a	b	d	c
a	1	1	1	1
d	1	1	1	1
b	0	1	1	1
c	0	0	1	1

- rows are arranged according to **outdegrees**
- columns are arranged according to **indegrees**

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Traces

If \succsim is an interval order, the relation \succsim^+ defined by

$$x \succsim^+ y \Leftrightarrow [y \succsim z \Rightarrow x \succsim z]$$

is a weak order (note that it is always reflexive and transitive)

It governs the order of the left side of intervals (outdegrees)

If \succsim is an interval order, the relation \succsim^- defined by

$$x \succsim^- y \Leftrightarrow [z \succsim x \Rightarrow z \succsim y]$$

is a weak order (note that it is always reflexive and transitive)

It governs the order of the right side of intervals (indegrees)

If \succsim is an interval order, the relation \succsim^\pm defined by

$$x \succsim^\pm y \Leftrightarrow [x \succsim^+ y \text{ and } x \succsim^- y]$$

may not be complete.

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Standard model with (even even more) caution

How to compare the objects in X ?

- simple procedure
 - build a mapping $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - compare objects using f with (even even more) caution

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + q(x, y)$$

$$x \sim y \Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f(x) \leq f(y) + q(x, y) \\ f(y) \leq f(x) + q(y, x) \end{array} \right\}$$

$q(x, y) = q(y, x) \geq 0$: symmetric threshold depending on both alternatives

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x, y) \geq f(y)$$

Standard model with (even even more) caution

Model

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + q(x, y)$$

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x, y) \geq f(y)$$

$q(x, y) = q(y, x) \geq 0$: symmetric threshold depending on both alternatives

Obvious properties of \succsim

- \succsim is **complete** $x \succsim y$ or $y \succsim x$, for all $x, y \in X$
- \succsim is **not transitive**, \succ is **not transitive**

Example

Model

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + q(x, y)$$

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x, y) \geq f(y)$$

$q(x, y) = q(y, x) \geq 0$: symmetric threshold depending on both alternatives

Example

$x \succ y, y \succ z, \text{Not}[x \succ z], \text{Not}[z \succ x] (x \sim z)$

$$v(x) = 10, v(y) = 6, v(z) = 2$$

$$q(x, y) = q(y, x) = 1, q(y, z) = q(z, y) = 1, q(x, z) = q(z, x) = 9$$

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Absence of circuits

Model

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + q(x, y)$$

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x, y) \geq f(y)$$

$q(x, y) = q(y, x) \geq 0$: symmetric threshold depending on both alternatives

Absence of circuit

$x_1 \succ x_2 \succ \dots \succ x_k \Rightarrow \text{Not}[x_k \succ x_1] (\forall k > 1)$

$$x_1 \succ x_2 \succ \dots \succ x_k \succ x_1$$

$$f(x_1) > f(x_2) + q(x_1, x_2)$$

$$f(x_2) > f(x_3) + q(x_2, x_3)$$

...

$$f(x_{k-1}) > f(x_k) + q(x_{k-1}, x_k)$$

$$f(x_k) > f(x_1) + q(x_k, x_1)$$

$q(x_k, x_1) + \sum_{i=1}^k q(x_i, x_{i+1}) < 0$, a contradiction since $q \geq 0$

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Suborders

Definition

A suborder \succsim is a complete binary relation such that \succ has no circuit

Theorem (Fishburn, 1970)

A binary relation on a finite set X is a suborder **if and only if** there is a real valued function u on X and a nonnegative symmetric threshold function q such that:

$$x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow f(x) + q(x, y) \geq f(y)$$

Remarks

- remains true if X is denumerable
- add order denseness condition in the general case

Summary: structures with threshold

suborder	variable threshold	$q(x, y) \geq 0$
interval order	variable threshold	$q(x) \geq 0$
semiorder	constant threshold	$q \geq 0$
weak order	null threshold	$q = 0$
total order	no indifference	\sim is trivial

Partial structures with threshold

Dominance with semiorders

$$X = \{a, b, c\}$$

$$c \succ_1 a, c \sim_1 b, b \sim_1 a \text{ (semiorder)}$$

$$a \succ_2 b, a \sim_2 c, c \sim_2 b \text{ (semiorder)}$$

$$b \succ_3 c, b \sim_3 a, a \sim_3 c \text{ (semiorder)}$$

Cycling

$$a \succ b: a \sim_1 b, a \succ_2 b, a \sim_3 b$$

$$b \succ c: b \sim_1 c, b \sim_2 c, b \succ_3 c$$

$$c \succ a: c \succ_1 a, c \sim_2 a, c \sim_3 a$$

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Structures with hesitation

Remarks

- in all models studied so far there is a sharp transition between \succ and \sim
- we may expect that in some case there is an “hesitation zone” between these two relations

Pseudo orders

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow f(x) > f(y) + p(y)$$

$$x \varphi y \Leftrightarrow f(y) + p(y) \geq f(x) > f(y) + q(y)$$

$$x \sim y \Leftrightarrow [f(x) \leq f(y) + q(y) \text{ and } f(y) \leq f(x) + q(x)]$$

- conditions on $\langle \succ, \varphi, \sim \rangle$ are known (Roy & Vincke, 1987)

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Extensions

Interval orders

- intervals are associated to objects

Extensions

- associate other geometrical shapes objects
- circles, trapezoids, etc.

Extensions

- special points within intervals

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Fuzzyness

Remarks

- all models use **crisp** binary relations
- either $x \succ y$ is true or it is false

Fuzzy models

- use **fuzzy** binary relations
- $x \succ y$ has a **degree of credibility** belonging to $[0, 1]$

Questions


- how to define classical properties (completeness, transitivity, etc) for fuzzy relations?
- not obvious but the use of cut relations is useful

$$x \succ_{\lambda} y \Leftrightarrow \succ(x, y) \geq \lambda$$

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Illustration



$\succ(b, a) \in [0, 1]$ is the credibility of the proposition “ $b \succ a$ ”

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