Program
14:20-14:30 | Opening remarks |
14:30-15:00 | Analysis of stochastic matching markets (Biro, Norman) |
15:00-15:30 | Strategy-proof mechanisms for two-sided matching with
minimum and maximum quotas (Ueda, Fragiadakis, Iwasaki,Troyan, Yokoo) |
15:30-16:00 | Consensus Games (Zappala, Alechina, Logan) |
16:00-16:30 | cofee break |
16:30-17:00 | Optimization and Stability in Games with Restricted Interactions (Meir, Zick, Rosenschein) |
17:00-17:30 | Coalitional Structure of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Tang, Sandholm) |
17:30-18:00 | Finding Core Utilizing Dual Solution in Synergy Coalition Group Representation (Ueda, Kitaki, Iwasaki, Yokoo) |
18:00-18:30 | Matching Models for Preference-sensitive Group Purchasing (Lu, Boutilier) |